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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains three research papers – all in different fields. The first paper in Chapter
2 approaches the problem of drawing inferences from companies that do not compare in size,
a problem that frequently causes inferential problems in accounting and finance research and
that accounting scholars refer to as the scaling problem. The second paper in Chapter 3 studies
companies that choose to become a Societas Europaea, a new European legal form. In particular,
the paper documents where and when companies incorporate and what changes in the company
alter shareholder value. The last paper in Chapter 4 backs out those financial analysts that are
optimists and pessimists. The paper links analysts’ attributes to optimists and pessimists and
generates an improved forecast that would entail if there were no optimists nor pessimists.
In finance and accounting, researchers often identify a common economic phenomenon by
comparing companies of different sizes. Examples include: relating company valuations to
the company’s corporate governance, relating a company’s abnormal accruals to the quality of
its auditor or relating the market capitalization of a company to its earnings. If researchers
do not control for size they do not know if the economic effect that they identify is related to
size or to some other reason. Most often, the researcher wants to establish the “other reason”
and therefore must employ a size correction approach. The traditional approach is to divide
the size affected variables by a size proxy. This approach has drawbacks, however. First,
to be meaningful, the size proxy must be positive, a requirement, that where it is not met,
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leads to the systematic exclusion of observations and therefore hampers generalization to all
companies. Second, even if all companies are included in the analysis, some companies can
have size proxies that are close to zero, size proxies that will therefore make the divided variable
very large. These large values can cause problems for statistical methods that identify economic
effects. Third, the traditional approach implicitly assumes that the variables that relate to size,
relate to size proportionally. It is not clear, however, why this assumption should be true for
all variables. On the contrary, economists frequently assume that output is not proportional to
input.
Chapter 2 mitigates the size problem by a simple transformation, the inverse hyperbolic
sine. The transformation turns the multiplicative effect of size into an additive effect that is
proxied by an additive size proxy. The disappearance of the multiplicative effect solves the
three problems of the traditional approach: the size proxy can now become negative and the
size proxy can be close to zero without unduly influencing the statistical estimation procedures.
Moreover, size need not be proportional to the variables that the researcher investigates.
Chapter 2 documents that this transformation approach produces results that are economi-
cally intuitive while the traditional approach often produces unintuitive results. The transfor-
mation approach has better statistical properties than the traditional approach for ordinary least
squares estimation, certainly the most widely estimation technique in economics. In one set-
ting, where market capitalization is predicted with two accounting numbers, earnings and book
value, the traditional approach has a root mean squared error that is about 2.5 times higher than
the root mean squared error of the transformation approach.
Chapter 3 studies companies that become a Societas Europaea (SE). The SE is a new legal
form, born in 2001, that is in part governed by European Union law. The European Commission
created the SE to allow European companies to easier change their seat within the EU, to easier
merge with other EU companies, to more flexibly manage its worker involvement and to more
flexibly choose its management structure. While the SE could create shareholder value through
less costly mergers, more efficient organisation of business units or better tailored worker in-
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volvement, it could also destroy value if managers use the SE to consolidate their power in the
company in order to follow their own agenda (e.g. build empires, consume perks). Chapter 3
studies how SEs create and destroy value.
While I do not find significant announcement returns following the change of worker in-
volvement in the company, I find that companies that work in regulated industries have 2.7
percentage points higher abnormal returns than companies in unregulated industries. In con-
trast, companies that change their management structure from two-tier (management board and
supervisory board) to one-tier (board of directors) have 3.7 percentage points lower abnormal
returns than companies that keep their management structure. The findings conform to the view
that the SE destroys value if managers use it to weaken their monitoring by abolishing the su-
pervisory board. In contrast, the SE’s flexibility to change its seat is valuable to companies that
operate in regulated industries, industries whose profitability depends on state permits or state
subsidies. At last, Chapter 3 finds that companies that become SEs are already underperforming
their industry peers before they change legal form.
Chapter 4 studies the behavior of financial analysts. For a theory of capital markets it is
important to understand how the participants in these markets behave. For a theory of account-
ing it is important to understand how users of the financial statement use accounting numbers.
Since financial analysts are expert participants in capital markets and expert users of financial
statements, the study of financial analysts provides important inputs for a theory of capital mar-
kets and a theory of accounting. In Chapter 4, Ingolf Dittmann and I explore the possibility that
financial analysts persistently provide forecasts that are wrong. Financial analysts that persis-
tently forecast too high earnings are optimists and those analysts that forecast too low earnings
are pessimists.
Our model provides empirical evidence that indeed analysts are optimists and pessimists.
Our model classifies 73 % of all analysts as optimists and 27 % as pessimists. We find that
optimists are less optimistic if they work for larger brokers. In contrast, pessimists do not
become less pessimistic if they work for larger brokers. We do not find evidence that analysts’
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experience explain their optimism or pessimism. As a practical consequence of our model we
can derive an earnings forecast that corrects individual forecasts for optimism and pessimism.
This forecast is more precise than conventional forecasts such as the consensus forecast (the
average of all individual forecasts). Our forecast can also explain more variation in earnings per
share than conventional forecasts.
As the thesis studies diverse fields its contribution to contemporary research is diverse.
Chapter 2 contributes to a large literature because size differences impede inference in many
areas in finance. The proposed transformation approach may improve: Capital structure studies,
payout policy studies and valuation studies. Examples in accounting include: Value relevance
studies and earnings quality studies.
Chapter 3 not only helps policy makers to understand how companies use SE legislation
but also to improve it. In particular, policy makers should insure that the monitoring role of
the board is not impaired if SEs change their board structure. Chapter 3’s research design
contributes to the corporate governance literature that studies the effectiveness of boards. Many
such studies suffer from a reverse causality problem: Does weak monitoring lead to lower
valuations or do lower valuations lead to weak monitoring (for example low value companies
have more stable cash flows that are easier to verify and therefore need less monitoring)? In
contrast, Chapter 3’s research design does not suffer from the reverse causality problem.
Chapter 4 deepens the knowledge about expert capital market participants. Our model pro-
vides the means to compare an analyst’s optimism across companies. In addition, Chapter 4
provides an improved earnings forecast that can readily be used by practitioners. Although we
currently do not investigate whether analysts’ incentives or character traits explain their opti-
mism our model provides an input to study these question in a later stage of the project. For
example, a comparison of optimism across firms can help explain why analysts are optimistic.
If analysts are optimistic to get better information from a more benign management, an analyst
would tend to be more optimistic for companies that have more idiosyncratic information. In
contrast, if optimism is a character trait one would expect that optimism changes little if an
4
optimistic analyst issues forecasts for a different company.
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Chapter 2
Mitigating scale effects in finance and
accounting research: A simple
transformation approach
This paper proposes a simple approach to mitigate scale differences among a cross section of
companies. In applications in accounting and corporate finance many firm characteristics scale
up with firm size: Compared to small firms, large firms pay larger dividends, large firms have
larger depreciation, large firms have more debt. Often researchers aim to compare companies
not on a total dollar basis but on a different scale that makes companies of different sizes com-
parable. The common approach in prior literature is to divide the variable that scales by size
by a size proxy. The approach in this paper, in contrast, is to transform variables that scale by
size by a logarithmic like transformation (the inverse hyperbolic sine), that is also defined for
non positive values, and to include an additive size proxy. The log like transformation turns the
problem of introducing a common scale into an omitted variable problem – a problem that has
been intensively studied in the statistics and econometrics literature. The approach proposed in
this paper has two advantages. First, the approach avoids the singularity problems that arise in
the traditional approach when the size proxy is close to zero. Second, the proposed approach is
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applicable for size proxies that can become negative and therefore avoids the sample selection
problems that might arise if the size proxy is required to be strictly positive.
For most of the paper the strategy is to contrast the proposed transformation approach with
the traditional approach by employing the same size proxy in both approaches. This procedure
ensures that the better performance of the transformation approach, that is demonstrated in the
paper, is solely due to different combination of the same information.
The paper has 2 major findings. First, in comparison with the traditional approach, the
proposed transformation approach yields results that are more consistent with theory and less
dependent on the size proxy employed. Specifically, for regressions of market value of equity
on gross margin, the proposed transformation approach yields coefficient estimates that are
higher in magnitude for positive gross margin than for negative gross margin; consistent with the
argument that for a going concern profits should be more informative than losses. In contrast,
the regressions that use the traditional approach sometimes yield positive gross margins that are
uninformative about market value or losses that have higher (positive) impact on market value
than profits. In a second application, the pricing of depreciation expense, the transformation
approach always prices depreciation expense not at all or negatively – consistent with theory.
In contrast, in some specifications that employ the traditional approach depreciation expenses
are positively priced – inconsistent with theory.
The second main finding: The econometric properties of the proposed approach are closer
to standard ordinary least squares assumptions than the traditional approach. In particular,
analyses of annual cross sections, in the spirit of Easton and Sommers (2003), demonstrate
that the proposed transformation approach yields specifications that have among the lowest
deviations from homoskedasticity, lack of fit and out of sample pricing error.
The paper contributes to the discussion how to overcome scale effects in market based ac-
counting research (Christie, 1987; Landsman and Magliolo, 1988; Kothari and Zimmerman,
1995; Barth and Kallapur, 1996; Brown et al., 1999; Easton and Sommers, 2003; Lo, 2004;
Barth and Clinch, 2009; García Lara et al., 2009). Although the applications chosen in the pa-
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per are in the field of market based accounting research, the approach can be used in any setting
where multiplicative size effects threaten causal inference. The proposed approach provides a
systematic way to mitigate size effects and thereby to improve inference.
2.1 Scale effects in cross sectional research designs
In the presence of short time series, the identification of economic effects in the corporate fi-
nance and accounting literature relies on cross sectional variation. In the cross section variables
are often correlated because they are scaled by some common size factor. For example, market
value of equity and sales are highly correlated because they both depend on size; large compa-
nies have more resources and can therefore generate higher sales. In general, large companies
have more of X and therefore need more of Y. Often researchers want to compare companies as
if they operated on the same scale without being specifically interested in size effects. There-
fore, researchers have to introduce a common scale for all companies.
In many finance applications the common scale is the value of the company’s assets at re-
placement costs. Here, the methodological issue is to find good proxies for replacement cost
to generate reliable measures of Tobin’s q (Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997). The accounting
literature focusses more on the econometric properties of models that employ different size
proxies. What theoretical construct these size proxies measure, is left unspecified. The dom-
inant approach to mitigate size effects in the finance and accounting literature is to divide all
size affected variables by a common size proxy. Lev and Sunder (1979) identify four problems
with this approach. First, the size proxy may be imperfect. If the size proxy measures size
with additive error then the ratio of the variable under interest (e.g., market value of equity)
and the size proxy will still depend on size. Therefore, it is impossible to infer in how far the
variable of interest or size is associated with the dependent variable. Second, the dependence
between size and size proxy might be non proportional. For example, if size is replacement
cost of the company’s assets and the size proxy is book value of total assets then replacement
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costs could increase faster than book values as young firms will invest more in intangible assets
that are not capitalized, yet are part of replacement costs. As young firms mature and begin to
harvest, their growth options decline and a larger part of their replacement costs will consist of
assets on the balance sheet. If market values were then divided by book value of total assets,
the proxy for replacement cost, one would erroneously conclude that younger firms create more
value as they have higher Tobin’s q. Third, dividing variables by a size proxy can lead to wrong
inferences of the association between two scaled variables: Two variables X
∗
S and
Y ∗
S can have
zero correlation if the true scale S is observable, yet X
∗
Sˆ
and Y
∗
Sˆ
can have non zero correlation if
the size proxy Sˆ is employed. Last, size proxies, such as book value of equity or net income,
can become zero or negative. If companies have a zero or negative size proxy they must be
excluded, which raises concerns of selection bias, or the analysis cannot be carried out. Both
outcomes are unsatisfactory.
In its methodological treatment of size effects, the accounting literature has focussed on
applications where market values or returns are regressed on accounting numbers (for example
regressions of market value of equity on earnings and book value). What is the correct scale
in this setting? As Christie (1987) observes, if the dependent variable is returns then the scale
is clear: all variables that are affected by size should be deflated by past realizations of market
value of equity. However, if the dependent variable is market value of equity then the choice
of the size proxy does not only depend on the assumptions about the underlying pricing re-
lationship, as Landsman and Magliolo (1988) note, but also on what economic variables the
researcher wants to explain. In contrats, if the researcher wants to explain if an accounting vari-
able is useful in making inferences about the market value of the company then no size proxy
needs to be included because scale is dollars of market values. If the researcher wants to explain
if an accounting variable is associated with intangible assets then the scale is tangible assets and
a size proxy could be tangible assets as reported on the balance sheet adjusted for inflation.
To sum up, the quality of the size proxy should only become prominent after the theoretical
construct of scale is specified. However, as Lev and Sunder (1979, p.194) observe:
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“Unfortunately, in most empirical applications the choice of a specific size mea-
sure is made in an ad hoc manner, often leading to ambiguities in the interpretation
and generalization of empirical findings.”
Nevertheless, even if the theoretical construct is market value of equity, dividing all regression
variables by a size proxy could be justified to overcome heteroskedasticity or nonlinearities in
the valuation function – all purely econometric reasons. This is the approach taken by Barth
and Kallapur (1996); Easton and Sommers (2003); Barth and Clinch (2009); García Lara et al.
(2009); Lo (2004). These studies recommend size proxies based on simulation studies (Barth
and Kallapur, 1996; Lo, 2004; Barth and Clinch, 2009) or the analysis of regression residuals
(Easton and Sommers, 2003). Easton and Sommers (2003) argue that size differences between
companies are not only a problem of heteroskedasticity, that in general leads to inefficient use
of the information in the sample but to consistent estimates, but a cause for coefficient bias.
If larger companies act economically different than smaller companies and if larger companies
are overweighted in regressions, as would be the case under size induced heteroskedasticity,
then ordinary least squares estimation results in biased coefficient estimates: The coefficient
estimates are more representative for the way that large companies do business than the way
small companies do business. Hence, Easton and Sommers (2003) suggest that the division of
regression variables by a size proxy is a means to overcome differences in the way large and
small companies do business that show up as nonlinearities in the dependence of market value
on accounting numbers. Easton and Sommers (2003) demonstrate that the residual variation
increases in market value for cross sectional regressions of market value on book value of equity
and net income. They observe a similar pattern for lack of fit; companies with the highest
market value have the highest residuals and therefore influence the estimated coefficients more
than companies with lower market value. Easton and Sommers (2003) argue that dividing all
regression variables by market value can mitigate some of this influence. In contrast, Barth
and Clinch (2009), by simulating Ohlson (1995)’s model augmented with a normal error and
different ways in which size can affect inferences, recommend either not to divide by size
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proxies at all or divide by the number of shares outstanding. García Lara et al. (2009) impose
additional assumptions on the Ohlson (1995) model and conclude that the standard deviation of
market value is the correct deflator. In a sample of COMPUSTAT firms, they find some support
for their conjecture. Finally, Ye (2007) proposes, based on his finding of lower pricing errors
for his approach, to weight by estimated market value if it is smaller than actual market and vice
versa. In general, the literature has come up with a plethora of size proxies but fails to agree on
an optimal proxy.
All the studies that base the choice of size proxy on purely econometric reasons, such as het-
eroskedasticity or lack of fit, divide the regression variables by other random variables. There-
fore these studies could change the economic interpretation of the regressions. For example, if
book value of equity is the size proxy then the dependent variable is the market to book ratio
which proxies a different economic construct than market value. Hence, if the purpose is to
explain market value of equity it is invalid to divide all variables by book value of equity even
if this resulted in better econometric properties because market-to-book ratio is a different con-
struct than market value. Thus a recommendation for the best size proxy by these studies can
only be made, if all size proxies that are considered, proxy for the same construct of scale.
Prior research not only uses parameter estimates but also the coefficient of determination
for inference. Brown et al. (1999) demonstrate that in the presence of size effects the practice
of comparing coefficients of determination (Collins et al., 1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999) as
a way to compare differences in value relevance is misleading. Although Gu (2007) proposes
an alternative measure for across sample comparison of value relevance, this approach is also
suspect to size effects.
In summary, the discussion demonstrates that size effects are a serious impediment to causal
inference in cross sectional research designs. Even if a good size proxy can be found on theoret-
ical grounds, scaling the regression variables by the size proxy and estimating the specification
by ordinary least squares, the dominant approach in the literature, can result in econometric
problems such as coefficient bias and heteroskedasticity. To this date the accounting literature
12
lacks a commonly accepted size proxy.
2.2 The transformation approach
In this section I outline an approach to mitigate scale effects in cross sectional studies in market-
based accounting research. The basic idea is to turn scale into an omitted variable that enters
the regression equation additively. The problem of mitigating scale effects is then the problem
of finding suitable size proxies.
Several studies assume a multiplicative size effect:
MVE = α∗0 S+α
∗
1 S×BVE∗+α∗2 S×EARNS∗+S× ε∗ (2.1)
where firm subscripts are omitted, MVE∗ = MVES , BVE
∗ and EARNS∗ are size-free market
value, book value of equity and earnings, respectively and S is size (equation (2) in Barth and
Clinch, 2009). The problem is that the researcher can observe only the size affected variables but
not the size directly. In consequence, if the size affected variables are regressed on each other
it is impossible to tell whether associations are between the underlying size-free constructs or
between size. The majority of prior literature mitigates this scale problem by dividing Equation
(2.1) by a size proxy.
Another approach, is to take the logarithm of the variables to turn the multiplicative scaling
of Equation (2.1) into additive scaling:
log(MVE∗)+ log(S) = β0+β1× log(BVE∗)+β2× log(EARNS∗)+β3× log(S)+ν (2.2)
The approach is problematic for two reasons. First, if Equation (2.1) is correctly specified then
Equation (2.2) cannot be correctly specified. In particular, the error term ν will be correlated
with the independent variables. Second, Equation (2.2) cannot be estimated for firms that take
on negative values on earnings, book value of equity and market value.
13
The first problem of inconsistency between Equation (2.1) and Equation (2.2) does not in-
validate taking the logarithm of all variables outright, however. On the one hand, in the absence
of strong assumptions about the earnings behavior through time and its correlation with other
variables, it is likely that the error term in Equation (2.1) is also correlated with earnings and
book value of equity. Indeed, prior literature interpretes a significant coefficient on earnings as
evidence that earnings are relevant for valuing companies. Whether this value relevance derives
from production efficiency, high quality products, superior cost management, hubris or some
other factor is left unspecified. Instead, researchers interprete earnings as a proxy for one of
those factors or a combination of those factors.1 On the other hand, it is not clear whether
Equation (2.1)’s functional form is correct. Starting with Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997), studies document that the linear specification is incorrect (see also for theoreti-
cal models Zhang, 2000; Tippett and Yilmaz, 2002; Ataullah et al., 2009). Hence, it is possible
that Equation (2.2) is correctly and Equation (2.1) incorrectly specified.
x
y
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
−10 −5 0 5 10
y = asinh(x)
y = ± log(2x)
Figure 2.1: The inverse hyperbolic sine
This figure shows the inverse hyperbolic sine (bold) and its asymptote sign log(2|X |)
The solution to the second problem, that the logarithm is only defined for positive values,
1If the error term in Equation (2.1) was uncorrelated with earnings this would raise the question why there are
other items in the income statement. These items would be value irrelevant and thus would have to cater to the
information needs of other stakeholders. Given the large body of literature that demonstrates that other items in
the income statement are value relevant this explanation is implausible.
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is to introduce a different transformation that is similar to the logarithm, yet is defined for all
(real) values. This transformation, depicted in Figure 2.1, is the inverse hyperbolic sine (asinh).
The asinh tends asymptotically to sign(x) log(2|x|); around zero it does not transform the data
at all (it is well approximated by the identity function at zero). Similar to the logarithm, the
asinh transformation moves observations with large magnitude to the center of the distribution.
In contrast, to the logarithm the asinh preserves the sign of the original variable. While it is
uncommon to use the asinh transformation in finance and accounting research, the statistics and
econometrics literature has stressed its virtues for some time (Burbidge et al., 1988; MacKinnon
and Magee, 1990).
In contrast to the traditional approach of dividing the regression equation by a size proxy,
the transformation approach avoids the singularity issues that appear if the divisor is close to
zero; if the divisor approaches zero the resulting observations in the regression equation will
become very large. The proposed transformation approach also does not suffer from the sample
selection problems that arise because the divisor must be positive (e.g. the exclusion of compa-
nies with negative book value). Moreover, instead of assuming that all regression variables are
proportional to one size proxy as in the current approach, the transformation approach allows
multiple size proxies that can have a different relationship to the regression variables than being
proportional.
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 illustrate the transformation approach. Figure 2.2 depicts a scat-
terplot of the asinh of market value against the asinh of earnings before extraordinary items
for COMPUSTAT manufacturing companies.2 The point cloud resembles a “V” shape where the
vertex is very close to zero; the shape expresses the familiar finding of Hayn (1995) that market
value increases in losses and profits. I scaled the asinh so that each unit change on any of the
axis corresponds approximately to a doubling of untransformed earnings and untransformed
market value. As is evident from Figure 2.2, a doubling of losses increases market value about
2Market value is from CRSP six month after financial year end. Companies must have non missing book value
of equity (COMPUSTAT item: seq) and earnings before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item: ib), information
on share prices and shares outstanding six month after financial year end and have the first digit of the standard
industrial classification code (SIC) equal to 2 or 3.
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Figure 2.2: Scatterplot of market value against earnings before extraordinary items
This figure shows a scatterplot of the inverse hyperbolic sine of market value against the inverse hyperbolic
sine of earnings for US manufacturing companies. The inverse hyperbolic sine is scaled so that its asymptote
is sign× log2(|x|). Hence, a one unit change on this scale corresponds to a doubling on the original scale.
1.7 times. The presence of size effects forces itself on as an explanation for this unintuitive find-
ing. As a consequence of the relationship of the asinh to the logarithm the scatterplot is similar
to a scatterplot of log(MVE∗)+ log(S) against log(EARNS∗)+ log(S) for profitable compa-
nies and similar to a scatterplot of log(MVE∗) + log(S) against − log(|EARNS∗|) + log(S)
for companies that make losses. If size is large relative to the size free variables (MVE∗ and
EARNS∗) one would expect a “V” shaped relationship between the asinh of market value and
the asinh of earnings that masks the relationship between size free market value and size free
earnings. The transformation approach corrects for the masking of the relationship between
size free market value and size free earnings by controlling for size additively.
Figure 2.3 depicts the relationship between the asinh of market value and the asinh of earn-
ings before extraordinary items for the same COMPUSTAT sample of manufacturing firms after
book value of equity, the size proxy, has been “partialled out”.3 If book value of equity is a
3“Partialled out” market value is the residual from a regression of the asinh of market value on an intercept and
the asinh of book value of equity where the coefficient on the book value of equity can change between positive
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Figure 2.3: Scatterplot of size corrected market value against size corrected earnings before
extraordinary items
This figure shows a scatterplot of the size corrected inverse hyperbolic sine of market value against the size cor-
rected inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings for US manufacturing companies. The inverse hyperbolic sine is scaled
so that its asymptote is sign× log2(|x|). Hence, a one unit change on this scale corresponds to a doubling on
the original scale. The inverse hyperbolic sine of market value and the inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings are
orthogonal to the inverse hyperbolic sine of book value of equity, the size proxy, in this figure.
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good size proxy then Figure 2.3 is a scatterplot of the asinh of size corrected market value
against the asinh of size corrected earnings. The top panel of Figure 2.3 splits the scatterplot
for loss firms (left) and profitable firms (right). The bottom panel contains all firms. Super-
posed the point cloud, the flat smooth curve indicates that there is no dependence between size
corrected market value and size corrected losses: The unintuitive relationship between losses
and market value vanished. The scatterplot in the bottom panel strongly resembles the hypoth-
esized relationship in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, Figure 1); investors do not have to incur
losses forever but instead have the option to abandon the firm, therefore losses should not signal
market value.
In conclusion, the transformation of the regression variables by the inverse hyperbolic sine
and inclusion of size proxies in the regression equation is another approach that can potentially
mitigate scale effects. The graphical illustration of this section can accomodate the unintuitive
result that market value increases in losses.
2.2.1 The choice of size proxies
The question remains what size proxies to include in the regression equation or whether to
include a size proxy at all. The answer depends on the research question that defines the the-
oretical construct of scale. If the research addresses the question whether particular financial
statement items are relevant for the valuation of companies, then it can be argued that no size
proxy should enter the regression equation because size is value relevant and therefore anything
associated with size will also be value relevant. For example, the financial statement user can
infer from the size of depreciation how valuable the company is relative to other companies
in the same way that knowledge of fuel consumption of a car is relevant to the buyer of a car
(more powerful engines use more fuel and are more expensive). Indeed, the financial statement
and negative book value of equity. “Partialled out” earnings is the sum of residuals from two regressions. The
first regression regresses the asinh of earnings for positive earnings and zero otherwise on an intercept and the
asinh of book value of equity where the coefficient on the book value of equity can change between positive and
negative book value of equity. The second regression regresses the asinh of earnings for negative earnings and zero
otherwise on an intercept and the asinh of book value of equity where the coefficient on the book value of equity
can change between positive and negative book value of equity.
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is often used in this way when private companies change hand for a multiple of sales revenue.
On the other hand, if the aim is to test whether financial statement items are associated with
positive net present value investments three applications come to mind.
First, market-based accounting studies often motivate their specifications with the models
described in Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995).4 In these models, book value
of equity is the size proxy and everything else that is not related to size is related to residual
income. Hence, the size corrected asinh of market value must be viewed as the asinh of the
present value of residual income. Feltham and Ohlson (1995) note that residual income contains
the understatement of book value with respect to the current market value of the company’s asset
and hence residual income contains effects of conservative accounting.
In contrast, the second type of application, that prevails in the finance literature, excludes
effects of conservatism in its scale construct. Scale is the replacement cost of total assets and
size corrected asinh of market value is the asinh of Tobin’s q (Tobin and Brainard, 1977).5 Size
proxies that are frequently employed are book value of equity or book value of total assets.6
Replacement costs for intangible assets can be proxied by sales, research and development
expense or advertising expenses.
The third research application is directed at explaining differences in market value between
two points in time. The scale is historical market value and size corrected market value is the
asinh of the difference between expected future cash flows today and expected future cash flows
in the past.
In conclusion, given the diverse focus of these research applications, correcting for size is
not purely an econometric exercise but also depends on the research questions that is asked.
4Holthausen and Watts (2001) provide an overview of these applications in market-based accounting research.
5For applications in corporate finance see among many others (Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Baker et al.,
2003; Faleye et al., 2006; Wang and Xie, 2009).
6More involved proxies for replacement costs are available (see Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997, for an example).
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2.3 Application of the transformation approach
This section describes the application of the transformation approach in two different settings;
the pricing of depreciation and the pricing of gross margin. The aim of the section is to demon-
strate that while the transformation method yields results that make economic sense, the tradi-
tional scaling approach yields results that are often economically unintuitive.
2.3.1 The pricing of gross margin
The first application tests how gross margin, defined as sales minus cost of goods sold, relates
to market value. Controlling for size, large positive gross margins signal the ability to demand
high premiums relative to manufacturing costs. If competitors need time to erode large gross
margins and consumer preferences are stable than gross margin will persist for a while and
will therefore correlate with market value. In contrast, large negative gross margins signal
that customers are not willing to pay a price that is higher than the production cost of the
company’s products. Owners will not tolerate negative gross margin forever but will rather
choose to abandon the business. Therefore, depending on investors tolerance negative gross
margins should be positively associated with market value, it should decrease value, or have no
effect at all.
Table 2.1 contains statistics from a regression of market value on gross margin for different
size proxies. While Panel A of Table 2.1 contains regression statistics for the transformation
approach, Panel B contains regression statistics for the traditional approach that scales all re-
gression variables by a size proxy. Specifically, Panel A contains statistics from the regression
model:
MVE†i,t = δ0+δ1GM
†
i,t×NGMi,t +δ2GM†i,t× (1−NGMi,t)
+δ3S†i,t +Timet +NGMi,t +Firmi+ηi,t (2.3)
for firm i at time t. y† = asinh(y), GM is gross margin, NGM is an indicator that is 1 if GM < 0
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and zero otherwise and S is one of the different size proxies indicated in the last rows of Panel
B. In contrast, Panel B contains statistics from the regression:
MVE
S i,t
= γ0+ γ1
GM
S i,t
×NGMi,t + γ2 GMS i,t× (1−NGMi,t)
+ γ3
BVE
S
†
i,t
+Timet +NGMi,t +Firmi+ξi,t (2.4)
The regression statistics are OLS estimates; standard errors are clustered by the firm and year.7
Many of the size proxies that Lo (2004) compiles by surveying prior accounting literature are
in Table 2.1.8
The first column of Table 2.1, Panel A, contains coefficient estimates when no size proxy is
included in the regression. Without controlling for size, market value changes by about 0.61 %
for a 1 % change in positive gross margin and by about 0.33 % for a 1 % change in negative
gross margin.9
So, contrary to the argument above, negative gross margin has a negative association with
market value; losses are priced positively. Except for the size proxy, lagged market value, in-
clusion of the other size proxies in the regression does not alter the effect, although the effect
is attenuated. If lagged market value enters the regression the pricing of negative gross mar-
gin vanishes. Most generally, all size proxies are positively correlated with market value and
positive gross margin is on average higher priced than negative gross margin; consistent with
the notion that positive gross margin should inform the company’s future cash flows more than
negative gross margin.
The results in Panel B oppose this notion. Except for the specifications that divide the re-
gression variables by sales or shares outstanding, a percentage change in negative gross margin
7The sample, drawn from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, is North American-companies between 1960 and 2009 with
positive size proxies. Market value is share price multiplied by shares outstanding six month after the fiscal year
end.
8Specifically, Table 2.1 includes: lagged total assets (ATt−1), book value of equity (BVE), total assets (AT),
sales (SAL), shares outstanding (SHROUT) and lagged market value (MVEt−1). Note, that it might be problematic
to use sales as a size proxy because it might be correlated with size corrected earnings. I include it, nevertheless,
because it is often employed in prior research.
9In Equation 2.3 slope coefficient are approximately equal to point elasticities.
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Table 2.1: Regressions of market value on gross margin for different size proxies and different
methods that mitigate scale effects
This table contains coefficient estimates and their standard errors for regressions of market value on gross margin
and size proxies. In Panel A all variables are transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine. In Panel B all variables are
divided by the size proxy indicated in the row labelled “Scale”. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects
and different intercepts for companies that have negative gross margin and positive gross margin. Standard errors
are clustered by firm and year. The adjusted R2adj measures the percent of remaining variation that is explained by
the regression variables after the fixed effects on market value are partialled out. Significance codes: • ∼ 10 %,
∗ ∼ 5 %, ∗∗ ∼ 1 % , ∗∗∗ ∼< 1 %
Panel A: Additive control for size (transformation approach)
Dependent variable:
Variable MVE
GM× -0.325∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.019
NGM (0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016)
GM× 0.614∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(1−NGM) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010)
TAt−1 0.088∗∗∗
(0.020)
BVE 0.500∗∗∗
(0.012)
TA 0.447∗∗∗
(0.017)
SAL 0.160∗∗∗
(0.017)
SHROUT 0.605∗∗∗
(0.019)
MVEt−1 0.676∗∗∗
(0.019)
R2adj 26.2 % 26.5 % 37.3 % 31.4 % 26.9 % 38.7 % 55.6 %
N 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842
Panel B: Division by size (traditional approach)
Dependent variable:
Variable MVE MVE MVE MVE MVE MVE
GM× -2,548.6∗∗∗ -7,437.7∗∗ -1,114.6∗∗ -657.3 -9,620.6∗∗∗ 2,118.0∗∗∗
NGM (418.6) (2,571.5) (405.1) (1,442.3) (2,417.9) (588.9)
GM× 1,969.5∗∗∗ -788.2 199.5∗ -6,681.4 902.9∗∗∗ -1,898.5∗∗∗
(1−NGM) (172.1) (737.1) (79.5) (10,230.3) (85.9) (530.9)
BVE 1,404.8∗∗∗ 1,886.4∗∗∗ 93.5 1,920.5∗∗∗ 2,455.1∗∗∗
(98.5) (529.5) (86.5) (223.2) (208.3)
Scale TA TAt−1 MVEt−1 SAL BVE SHROUT
R2adj 3.4 % 14.6 % 6.2 % 60.3 % 71.2 % 72.9 %
N 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842 139,842
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associates with higher market values than a percentage change in positive gross margin: A dollar
of loss generates more market value of equity than a dollar of profit! For sales, neither positive
nor negative gross margin has a significant effect on market value and for shares outstanding,
companies with more negative gross margins have on average lower market values, which is
consistent with theory, but companies with more positive gross margins also have on average
lower market value, which is inconsistent with theory.
Comparison of Panel A and Panel B shows that across specifications the results are more
stable in Panel A than in Panel B: For all specifications that use the transformation approach
negative and positive gross margin is positively priced, where the effect is stronger for positive
gross margin and the size proxy is significant and positive. These main findings do not depend
on the choice of the size proxy. This behavior would be expected if all specifications tried to
operationalize a similar theoretical construct: The explanation of economic value generation by
accounting numbers.
Why is negative gross margin positively priced in the specifications that are summarized in
Table 2.1? One possible reason is the inability of the size proxies to precisely measure the theo-
retical construct. For example, if book value of total assets alone proxies for replacement costs
of total assets then effects of conservative accounting and intangible assets are ignored. High
intangible assets would allow a company to incur high negative gross margins. Thus, without
a proper control for intangible assets negative gross margin must be positively correlated with
market value; Hand (2003) and Darrough and Ye (2007) find some evidence for this explana-
tion. Similarly, if the research design posits that book value of equity is scale than effects of
conservative accounting and intangible assets are not controlled for and negative gross margin is
positively correlated with market value. If the effect of conservatism and the effect of intangible
assets changes slowly from year to year then a significant part of their joint effect on market
value should already be contained in last year’s market value. Therefore, in corroboration of the
argument that intangible assets and conservatism cause the positive pricing of negative gross
margin, in the specification where scale is last year’s market value negative gross margin is not
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priced.
2.3.2 The pricing of depreciation expense
The second application tests how depreciation expense relates to market value. In one view de-
preciation is irrelevant for equity valuation because it is not a cash flow. This view is expressed
in Christie (1987, p. 249):
“When the dependent variable is value, then, cross-sectionally, virtually any
levels variable has the potential to cause specification errors. An obvious example
is accounting depreciation, which, at least within manufacturing firms, will tend to
differ with the scale of the firm but will not have any economic explanatory power.”
On the other hand, relative to size, high depreciation expenses could signal that the company
operates with old assets that need replacement in the future. Replacements elicit capital expen-
ditures, cash outflows, that reduce the value of the company ceteris paribus. High depreciation
could also signal that management is careless in managing the assets of the company. No matter
which view one adopts, depreciation should not positively relate to firm value. An econometric
specification that produced a positive pricing of depreciation would be suspect of not controlling
for size properly. The following specification tests the ability of the transformation approach to
mitigate scale effects:
MVE†i,t = a0+a1DP+a2EBITDA
†
i,t×LOSSi,t +a3EBITDA†i,t× (1−LOSSi,t)
+a4S
†
i,t +Timet +LOSSi,t +Firmi+κi,t (2.5)
for firm i at time t. y† = asinh(y), DP is depreciation and amortization expense, EBITDA is
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and LOSS is 1 if EBITDA < 0
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and 0 otherwise. The specification of the traditional approach that divides by a size proxy is:
MVE
S i,t
= b0+b1DP+b2
EBITDA
S i,t
×LOSSi,t +b3 EBITDAS i,t× (1−LOSSi,t)
+b4
BVE
S i,t
+Timet +LOSSi,t +Firmi+φi,t (2.6)
Panel A of Table 2.2 contains coefficient estimates for the transformation approach and
Panel B contains coefficient estimates for the regressions that divide by a size proxy. The
sample is North American manufacturing companies from COMPUSTAT.10 As is evident from
Panel A, in the absence of a size proxy depreciation is positively associated with market value;
depreciation is the size proxy in this setting. In contrast, in the remaining specifications in Panel
A, that include a size proxy, depreciation is either negatively related to market value or not
related at all (for lagged total assets). These negative or insignificant coefficients are consistent
with the argument above that depreciation expense signals future capital expenditures that have
a negative effect on market value. The coefficients on the other variables are also consistent with
expectations: negative EBITDA has a smaller effect on market value than positive EBITDA and
all size proxies have a positive coefficient.
In contrast, the coefficient estimate on depreciation for some of the specifications in Panel
B is positive. In particular, the specifications that divide the regression variables by sales, book
value of equity or lagged market value produce a significant positive coefficient on depreciation.
The other specifications yield the negative or insignificant coefficient that is consistent with
theory. In some specifications the coefficient estimates are unintuitive. Specifically, in the
specification that divides by sales only depreciation and book value of equity are significantly
associated with market value; EBITDA is not associated with market value. In the specification
that divides by lagged market value, market value tends to be higher for companies with larger
negative EBITDA but market value is not associated with positive EBITDA.
10To be included in the sample, the first digit of companies’ SIC code has to be equal to 2 or 3 and all size proxies
must be positive. Market value is CRSP share price multiplied by shares outstanding six month after financial year
end. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.
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Table 2.2: Regressions of market value on depreciation for different size proxies and different
methods that mitigate scale effects
This table contains coefficient estimates and their standard errors for regressions of market value on depreciaiton,
EBITDA and size proxies. In Panel A all variables are transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine. In Panel B
all variables are divided by the size proxy indicated in the row labelled “Scale”. All regressions include firm
and year fixed effects and different intercepts for companies that have negative EBITDA and positive EBITDA.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The adjusted R2adj measures the percent of remaining variation
that is explained by the regression variables after the fixed effects on market value are partialled out. Significance
codes: • ∼ 10 %, ∗ ∼ 5 %, ∗∗ ∼ 1 % , ∗∗∗ ∼< 1 %
Panel A: Additive control for size (transformation approach)
Dependent variable:
Variable MVE
DP 0.129∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015)
EBITDA× -0.158∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.020
LOSS (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
EBITDA× 0.456∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(1−LOSS) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010)
TAt−1 0.159∗∗∗
(0.040)
BVE 0.481∗∗∗
(0.020)
TA 0.630∗∗∗
(0.032)
SAL 0.292∗∗∗
(0.022)
SHROUT 0.657∗∗∗
(0.033)
MVEt−1 0.599∗∗∗
(0.020)
R2adj 22.9 % 23.4 % 33.6 % 30.9 % 25.2 % 34.8 % 46.3 %
N 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109
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Table 2.2: Continued
Panel B: Division by size (traditional approach)
Dependent variable:
Variable MVE MVE MVE MVE MVE MVE
DP -3,552.6∗∗∗ -553.9 3,033.1∗∗ 59,280.6∗ 13,292.9∗∗∗ -7,188.1∗∗∗
(1,036.3) (6,741.3) (1,142.4) (26,499.6) (1,156.8) (1,880.9)
EBITDA× -3,060.6∗∗∗ -9,205.8∗ -1,189.1∗∗∗ 2,182.9 -7,484.2∗∗∗ -1,005.5•
LOSS (386.6) (3,911.7) (306.1) (1,549.8) (1,500.5) (520.0)
EBITDA× 7,057.5∗∗∗ 7,825.1∗∗∗ 254.4 -32,161.8 4,636.3∗∗∗ 3,350.5∗∗∗
(1−LOSS) (424.3) (1,209.5) (330.1) (19,856.5) (572.6) (807.2)
BVE 1,001.0∗∗∗ 3,321.1∗∗∗ 328.4∗∗∗ 2,073.3∗∗∗ 1,019.2∗∗∗
(214.5) (521.7) (63.0) (231.0) (154.4)
Scale TA TAt−1 MVEt−1 SAL BVE SHROUT
R2adj 5.6 % 27.1 % 28.5 % 69.4 % 90.0 % 54.4 %
N 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109 40,109
Overall, the observations in this section are similar to the previous section: In contrast to
the traditional approach, the findings for the transformation approach are robust to the size
proxy that is used. This observation is consistent with the assumption that all specifications that
employ the transformation approach measure a similar theoretical construct independent of the
size proxy that is employed.
In summary, the applications demonstrate that the transformation approach yields results
that are consistent with theory whereas some specifications that employ the traditional approach
of dividing the regression variables by a size proxy yield unintuitive results. Moreover, the trans-
formation approach generally yields results that do not qualitatively depend on the size proxy
that is employed; coefficients have the same sign. In contrast, the insights from the traditional
approach depend on the size proxy. One concern is that extreme observations drive these con-
clusions. Therefore, I follow the common practice and winsorize all scaled regression variables
by 3 % from below and above. The results improve for the traditional specifications, neverthe-
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less, the main conclusions stay the same.11 Another concern is that, following convention, the
specifications that divide regression variables by a size proxy include book value of equity as an
additional variable. Therefore, these regressions contain more information than their equivalent
in the transformation approach. The exclusion of book value of equity does not change the
qualitative findings of this section, however.
2.4 Tests for lack of fit and deviation from homoskedasticity
The analysis in this section is in the spirit of Easton and Sommers (2003) who analyse the
lack of fit and non-constancy of the error variance that is caused by the presence of size. Lack
of fit indicates deviations from the linear functional form of the regression equation or the
omission of variables that explain market value. In general, in the presence of lack of fit or
omitted variables, coefficient estimates in the regression are biased and inconsistent. Non-
constancy of the error variance indicates that some observations contain more information about
the underlying relationship between market value and accounting numbers and therefore should
be weighted heavier in the regression. In consequence, ordinary least squares estimation, which
weights observations equally, does not employ the full information in the sample and will thus
lose its power to detect dependencies in the sample.
The analysis of the lack of fit and the non-constancy of the error variance yields the fol-
lowing results: The model that divides by lagged market capitalization and the model that
transforms all variables by the asinh outperform the other models in terms of goodness of fit
and deviation from constancy of the error variance. Nevertheless, both models show systematic
deviations from the ideal case where all regression variables are multivariate normal.
Similar to prior studies (Barth and Kallapur, 1996; Easton and Sommers, 2003; Barth and
11In particular, in both applications losses (negative GM or negative EBITDA) and profits (positive GM or
EBITDA) are now positively priced; except in the application that scales by total shares outstanding where losses
are not priced. In the first application, negative gross margin remains to have a much larger effect on market value
than positive gross margin. In the second application, the coefficient on depreciation is positive for the specifica-
tions that scale by book value of equity and lagged total assets and negative for the remaining specifications.
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Clinch, 2009), I test the following specifications for lack of fit and monotone spread:
MVE†i = ψ0+ψ1EARN
†
i ×Li+ψ2EARN†i × (1−Li)+ψ3BVE†i +Li+ ei (2.7)
where Li = 1 if EARNi < 0 and zero otherwise. The corresponding formulation for the approach
that divides all regression variables by a size proxy is:
MVE
S i
= ω0+ω1
EARN
S i
×Li+ω2 EARNS i× (1−Li)+ω3
BVE
S i
+Li+ fi (2.8)
where S is one of the size proxies of the prior sections. This specification is often used to test
the incremental explanatory power of other items from the financial statement. Researchers
motivate this specification with the models of Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995)
that supply a valuation function that is linear in earnings and book in a company’s value of eq-
uity.12 The estimates from these specifications are from yearly cross section of North American
companies from 1963 until 2009.13
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the distribution of annual standardized mean residuals for market
value deciles. Specifically, in each year the residuals are assigned to market value deciles. For
each decile the mean residual is divided by the standard deviation of residuals and multiplied
by the square root of the number of observations. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 depict boxplots of the
t-statistic generated in this way for the years 1963 until 2009 for all specifications. Clearly
visible from Figure 2.4, which is drawn on the same scale for all models, is a large variation
of t-statistics across models. For the models that divide the regression variables by book value
of equity (book value), shares outstanding (shares), lagged assets (lagged assets), total assets
(assets) or sales (sales), deviations of 10 standard deviations from the mean in some years are
not uncommon. Division by sales or lagged total assets can even produce errors that are 100
12The choice of the size proxy in the transformation approach is unclear. Book value of equity has arguably
the strongest resemblance to the (Ohlson, 1995) model and therefore enters the specification above. In unreported
analysis I find, however, that proxying size by lagged market capitalization yields a better specified model.
13The construction of the sample and the selection requirements are the same as in the previous sections. Earn-
ings are earnings before extraordinary items. The qualitative results in this section are robust to winsorizing all
variables by 3% from below and above.
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Figure 2.4: Lack of fit for regressions of market value on earnings before extraordinary items
and book value – same scale
This figure shows lack of fit for annual regressions of market value on earnings and book value. For each model,
labelled in the top of each panel, and every year the residuals are sorted into market value deciles; the groups
corresponding to the deciles are depicted on the x axis. For each decile the mean of residuals is divided by the
standard deviation in the decile and multiplied by the square root of observations in the decile. This statistic is the
value of the y-axis. The distribution of this statistic over the years 1963 until 2009 is depicted in box plots for all
models. The grey lines are a 95 % confidence interval if the statistic is zero and independently distributed over the
years. The panel labelled “ideal” is the distribution of the statistic for simulated normal variables. All panels are
drawn on the same scale.
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standard deviations from the mean. On the other hand, the model that scales by lagged market
value (lagged macap) and asinh (asinh), the transformed model, have boxplots that are barely
distinguishable from the two grey lines that is a 5 % confidence interval if the t-statistics is zero
and independent across the years.
To explore the lack of fit further, Figure 2.5 depicts the t-statistics on different scales. The
panel in the bottom left, which is labelled “ideal”, depicts the t-statistics when the regression
variables are multivariate normal and hence, when OLS is the best estimator. As would be
expected in this setting, across market value deciles, the standardized residuals are nearly zero,
the distribution in each decile is symmetric and t-statistics are seldom out of the confidence
interval. In contrast, for the asinh model, for more than 25 % of the years the t-statistic is out of
the confidence interval in deciles 1, 6, 7 and 10. In the extreme deciles 1 and 10 the model tends
to underestimate market value and in deciles 6 and 7 the model overestimates market value.
Except for the model that scales by lagged market value the other models perform much worse.
For the model that scales by total assets, in three deciles and for the model that scales by book
value, in two deciles, more than 75 % of t-statistics are out of the confidence interval. For these
and the models that use sales, shares outstanding and lagged assets it is not uncommon to find
t-statistics out of the confidence interval in 50 % of the years. Most of the models have the
largest residuals for companies with the smallest market capitalization. This observation points
to the omission of variables from the models that are important in valuing small companies.
Turning to the non-constancy of the residual variance of the models, Figure 2.6, shows the
distribution of mean absolute studentized residuals for market value deciles for the years 1963
until 2009. The design of this figure is similar to the setup of Figure 2.4 . Instead of aver-
aging over t-statistics for each model, in each market value decile in each year, however, in
Figure 2.6 absolute studentized residuals are averaged. In addition, the square root transforms
these absolute studentized residuals to make the distribution of the residuals more symmetric.
The multivariate normal setting, that is labelled “ideal” in the bottom left panel, demonstrates
that when OLS is the best predictor, the absolute studentized residuals are constant across mar-
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Figure 2.5: Lack of fit for regressions of market value on earnings before extraordinary items
and book value – varying scale
This figure is the same as Figure 2.4, however, in this figure the scale of the t-statistic varies from panel to panel.
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Figure 2.6: Deviation from homoskedasticity for regressions of market value on earnings before
extraordinary items and book value
This figure shows deviations from homoskedasticity for annual regressions of market value on earnings and book
value. For each model, labelled in the top of each panel, and every year, the residuals are sorted into market value
deciles; the groups corresponding to the deciles are depicted on the x axis. For each decile the mean of the square
root of absolute studentized residuals is depicted on the y-axis. The distribution of this statistic over the years 1963
until 2009 is depicted in box plots for all models. The panel labelled “ideal” is the distribution of the statistic for
simulated normal variables. All panels are drawn on the same scale.
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ket value deciles at an average value of about 0.8. The sampling variation is modest with an
interquartile range of about 0.2. This constancy is contrasted with the specifications that are
estimated with real data. All models that divide the regression variables by a size proxy have
the highest residual variance in the highest market value decile. Except for the model that scales
by lagged market value, the models have a tendency to produce monotone spread, i.e. the in-
crease of the residual variance to increase with market value. In consequence, OLS will weigh
high market value firms more than is warranted by their overall contribution to the information
of the relationship between market value earnings and book value of equity. This weighting is
not only inefficient but potentially misleading because there is lack of fit in the most extreme
market value deciles as Figures 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate. Thus, OLS will exacerbate the lack of
fit. The model that transforms all variables by the asinh neither has constant residual variance.
Compared to the other specifications, the residual variance of the asinh model decreases with
market value. Hence, OLS will underweight companies with larger market value. Although
traditional tests would reject homoskedasticity for all models, it is evident from Figure 2.6 that
the deviation from constant error variance is much smaller for the asinh model on average.
Moreover, the variation of the residual variance across the years is smaller for the asinh model,
demonstrating that large deviations from homoskedasticity are uncommon.
So far the specifications have only been tested within sample. Without testing the specifi-
cations out of sample, it is possible that the models pick up spurious relationships that do not
hold in other settings. Since, under US GAAP financials statements should be consistent, i.e.
comparable across time, a natural choice for testing the model in a different setting is the next
financial year. Therefore, if the specification picks up a spurious relationship between mar-
ket value and earnings in the current financial year it should have a poor performance in the
next financial year. In particular, I estimate the specifications in the current year and, based on
these fitted models, make a prediction of market value with accounting data from the next year.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for absolute relative prediction errors for the predictions
generated in this way.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics of out of sample absolute pricing errors
This table contains summary statistics for absolute pricing errors. Errors are the relative absolute difference be-
tween market value and a forecast of market value that is based on this year’s earnings before extraordinary items,
book value of equity and size proxy but on last year’s model fit. The generation of errors in this way starts in 1963
and ends in 2008. Q25 is the lower quartile, Q50 is the median, AVG is the mean, Q75 is the upper quartile,
√
MSE
is the mean squared error, N is the number of observations and N < 0 is the number of observations that provide a
negative forecast.
Q25 Q50 AVG Q75
√
MSE N N(<0)
asinh 0.194 0.406 0.649 0.691 1.926 139,035 0
TA 0.260 0.577 1.147 1.181 3.956 139,035 7,928
TAt−1 0.294 0.675 1.610 1.518 5.639 139,035 13,928
MVEt−1 0.102 0.194 0.251 0.328 0.675 139,035 20
SAL 0.505 1.340 4.235 3.751 15.237 139,035 19,727
BVE 0.263 0.578 1.102 1.142 4.751 139,035 2,746
SHROUT 0.225 0.495 1.052 1.012 3.170 139,035 6,968
LOESS 0.178 0.378 0.642 0.659 3.970 139,035 0
MVE 0.125 0.280 0.466 0.531 1.192 139,035 0
Among the specifications, the specification that transforms by the asinh has the second
smallest root mean squared error (
√
MSE), even though it uses the least information (together
with the model that scales by book value of equity); the asinh model does not include the
additional size proxies that the other models use. A comparison of the specification that divides
by book value of equity demonstrates that the root mean squared errors can be reduced by about
60 % by simply combining the available information differently. Overall, the specification
that scales by lagged market value has the smallest root mean squared error. Contrasting this
outperformance against the prediction that next year’s market value is this year’s market value,
reported in the bottom row of Table 2.3, suggests that some of the outperformance is driven by
the inclusion of the additional information in last years market value used by the model that
scales by lagged market value. The last column of Table 2.3 contains the number of predictions
that predict a negative market value. For the specifications that scale by lagged assets or sales
more than 10 % of market value predictions are negative. Again, the asinh specification and
the specification that scales by lagged market capitalization perform better with respect to this
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dimension; the asinh never produces a negative forecast and the specification that scales by
lagged market value produces 20 negative forecasts.
Easton and Sommers (2003) note that the presence of scale causes nonlinearites between
market value and earnings. If nonlinearities are persistent then a nonparametric fit should pick
these up and outperform the asinh specification. The row labelled “LOESS” depicts a summary
of the absolute percentage error of a locally weighted regression (Das and Lev, 1994; Cleve-
land et al., 1988) of the asinh of market value on the asinh of earnings and the asinh of book
value of equity. The summary statistics of the prediction errors, which are not too different
from the asinh specification, demonstrate that the assumed linear model is a reasonable first
approximation.
2.5 Conclusion & Discussion
This paper proposes to use transformations by the inverse hyperbolic sine (asinh) to overcome
impediments to inference that are caused by difference in scale in a cross section of companies.
Instead of “canceling out” size from variables by division by a size proxy, the predominant
approach in the accounting literature, the asinh transformation turns the multiplicative scale
effect into an additive effect; the problem of scale becomes the problem of controlling for an
omitted variable. The method employed in this paper can therefore draw on a large number of
prior contributions whose aim is to mitigate omitted variable bias.
The tests of the paper demonstrate that the proposed approach yields more intuitive results
economically than the traditional approach that scales the variables by a size proxy. In addition,
the proposed approach has among the best out of sample performance, least deviation from
heteroskedasticity and least lack of fit. Since the approach of the paper is to use the same
information used by traditional approaches, results are driven by a better combination of the
available information. While the choice of size proxy varies over applications, depending on
what economic construct is to be explained, the size proxy , lagged market value, yields the
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least “surprising” results in the applications of this paper.
The proposed transformation approach relates accounting variables to the asinh of mar-
ket value. This focus on the asinh is warranted if the research interest lies in the elasticity
between the size corrected economic construct (e.g. Tobin’s q) and size corrected account-
ing numbers. The approach is biased, however, if the interest is in market value because
E[MVE] 6= sinh(E[asinh(MBE]). Therefore, if the focus is on forecasting market value, de-
pending on the bias of the transformation approach, a different approach might be more fruitful.
One way is to deviate from the assumption of a normal error and instead introduce a distribu-
tion that is more consistent with the data, such as the Gamma distribution, that has only positive
support (like market values) and scales proportionally with its value.14 Procedures to fit this
generalized linear model are well researched (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) and available in
most statistical packages. Inferential methods that are known from standard linear models are
also applicable for generalized linear models.
14The behavior of the variance of the Gamma distribution is consistent with Easton and Sommers (2003)’s claim
that “scale is market capitalization”.
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Chapter 3
Value creation and value destruction in the
Societas Europaea: Evidence from the new
legal form
The main purpose of the paper is to provide early evidence on the value of the Societas Europaea
(SE) to shareholders. The SE is a recent legal form that is partly based on European Union (EU)
law. The SE came into existence in 2001 to allow publicly-limited companies greater cross
border mobility within the EU, to freely contract their worker’s involvement in the company, to
decide between a two-tier (i.e. supervisory board and management board) or one-tier (i.e. board
of directors) board structure and to easily relocate within the EU. Prior to the SE these actions
were either costly or legally impossible.
This paper is the first that relates SE announcement returns to corporate governance changes
that follow SE adoption. The paper thus contributes to a recent report commissioned by the
European Commission (Ernst & Young, 2009) that evaluates the SE’s success based on survey
data and number of registrations. The paper also complements an earlier study of Eidenmüller
et al. (2010) that studies SE announcement returns.
The paper uses two different samples. First, the paper links announcement returns of 47
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companies that want to become SEs to information in their merger / conversion reports. Second,
the paper studies the return on assets of 48 listed and non-listed SEs before and after they
become SEs.
The three main findings are: First, listed SEs that change their board structure from two-tier
to one-tier have 3.7 percentage points lower abnormal announcement returns than SEs that keep
the two-tier structure. The one-tier board manages the company whereas in the two-tier board
the supervisory board may only supervise the management board. Therefore the one-tier board
is better capable to benefit from the expertise of all its board members than the two-tier board.
If the board’s provision of expertise is valuable for shareholders then the documented drop in
returns following the change in board structure must be attributed to the board’s other role – its
monitoring role. Unfortunately, the small sample size prevents me from a meaningful analysis
of the factors that explain the board’s weakened monitoring role.
Second, listed SEs that operate in the online gambling or renewable energy industries have
on average 2.5 percentage points higher abnormal returns than listed SEs operating in other
industries. The finding conforms to the hypothesis that the SE’s ability to (credibly threat to)
relocate is more valuable to companies that critically rely on special legislation to do business.
Some EU countries have recently banned or are reviewing their laws for private online gambling
service providers. The SEs in the renewable energy industry, all of them German, critically
depend on subsidies that make the production of “green energy” profitable. These tax subsidies
will expire in the future. Therefore, relocation to countries with higher subsidies might be
beneficial for these companies. Even if they do not relocate, the credible threat of relocation
increases their lobbying power with the government.
Third, while I do not find significant changes of return on assets after listed and non-listed
companies become SEs I document that SEs are already underperforming their industry peers
before they become SEs.
I do not find any significant unconditional announcement returns. Moreover, I do not find
significant evidence for all my hypotheses concerning worker involvement in the company.
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Specifically, companies in Germany, the country with the highest degree of worker involve-
ment, do not have significantly different announcement returns than companies in other coun-
tries. German companies with different worker participation laws do not have different an-
nouncement returns. Last, companies with a less concentrated European work force do not
have higher abnormal returns. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the partici-
pation of a more diverse work force impairs worker’s voice in the company affairs to the benefit
of shareholders.
The paper contributes to the literature that establishes a link between board characteristics
and shareholder value (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Cotter et al., 1997; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006;
Hwang and Kim, 2009). Because of the simultaneity between performance metrics and the se-
lection of board members many studies can be criticized for their problems to establish stronger
causal links between board characteristics and performance. In contrast, this paper, using board
structure changes that are exogenous to announcement returns, provides a stronger causal link
between board structure and performance. Due to its small sample size the paper can only
analyse differences between two-tier and one-tier boards and cannot dissect what factors in
the board could explain weaker monitoring. The paper complements recent literature that uses
exogenous shocks to identify value effects of the board (Ahern and Dittmar, 2010).
The remainder of the paper provides a short overview of the main benefits of the SE in
Section 3.1 and develops hypotheses in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the sample and its
selection, Section 3.4 presents evidence on the hypotheses and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 The Societas Europaea: What makes it different?
The Societas Europaea (SE) is a legal form that was created by EU law in 2004.1 The SE is
a public limited liability company with share capital. The unique feature of the SE is that it is
partly governed by EU law. This feature enables the SE to have legal personality in all member
states of the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). The feature also
1The EU law is Council Regulation No 2157/2001 and Council Directive 2001/86/EC.
41
vests the SE with rights national public limited liability companies do not have. In particular
the SE can
• change its seat (a company’s central place of administration) within the EU and the EEA
without being forced in dissolution
• undertake cross border mergers
• choose among board structures (one-tier: board of directors or two-tier: management
board & supervisory board)
• sidestep national worker involvement laws by concluding its own agreement with its em-
ployees
The SE can be formed in four ways – conversion, merger, creation of a holding company or
creation of a subsidiary. In a conversion an already existing public limited company changes its
legal status to a SE. In a merger two publicly limited companies from different member states
either merge to become a new firm or one company absorbs the other. Public or private limited
companies from different member states render their shares to a holding company that is an SE.
In this way they create a holding SE. Finally, companies with cross border activity can form a
subsidiary SE.
I discuss the advantages of the SE in turn:
Change of seat Prior to the SE it was impossible or difficult to relocate to other member states.
Relocation is a change of a company’s headquarters and/or of the place where the com-
pany is registered. Often member states penalize a relocation of a company’s head office
to another member state by liquidation or its non recognition in the host state (Storm,
2006). In most member states a company can only relocate its registered office by liq-
uidating the company in its current member state and subsequently form a new entity in
the new member state. This process is costly as hidden reserves are taxed and the change
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from one legal form and system to another causes legal uncertainty. Subject to the ap-
proval of the general meeting and the requirement that head and registered office are in
the same place, SEs do not change legal personality when they relocate. Hence SEs do not
incur the costs national public limited liability companies have to bear upon relocation.
Cross border mergers Before the SE, it was impossible or difficult for companies to merge
with companies in other member states. In most countries the acquirer had to purchase
all of the shares of the target and then integrate the target’s assets into its operation or form
a new company with its own assets and that of the target. Possible taxes, the creation of a
new legal person and the possibility of minority shareholders to hold up the transactions
necessary to carry out the merger made mergers costly and risky. To highlight the com-
plexity of cross border mergers before the SE came into existence the merger between
German Hoechst AG and French Rhône-Poulenc S.A. in 1999 is instructive.2
The companies want to effect a cross border merger between equals to become the new
pharmaceutical company Aventis. Both companies are holding companies that own stakes
in other companies in the pharmaceutical industry. The final deal that both parties agreed
on looks like this: Rhône-Poulenc first makes a bid to the shareholders of Hoechst AG. If
more than 90 % of Hoechst shareholders render their shares, Rhône-Poulenc will compen-
sate them with its newly issued shares. After that Rhône-Poulenc will change its statutes,
transfer its seat to Strasbourg (from Paris) and will adopt a two-tier board structure. There
will be parity amongst the German and French members on the management board. The
merged company will be called Aventis.
The structure Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc choose has drawbacks. Hoechst will be an in-
termediate holding company within Aventis with no apparent purpose. In the likely event
that not all the shareholders render their shares, minority shareholders remain in Hoechst.
These shareholders have special rights because the newly formed Aventis will dominate
Hoechst. They have the power to hold up and sue Aventis. Hold up and shareholder
2Popular transactions that effect a cross border merger are described in Stengel (2002).
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litigation will be likely when Aventis tries to integrate business units of Hoechst as part
of its restructuring plan. In addition, Hoechst has to keep complying with the disclosure
requirements of a public company. It is therefore not surprising that one clause in the
merger agreement states that Aventis converts into a SE once the law is available.3
Hoffmann (1999) discusses alternatives to the deal and makes clear why a simpler struc-
ture of the deal was not possible. A direct merger between the companies is not possible
as the German law only regulates domestic mergers. Hoechst AG could incorporate in
France and then merge with Rhône-Poulenc under French law. However, according to
French and German law it is only possible to incorporate in another country if the seat of
a company is changed simultaneously. Yet a change of seat would be impossible with-
out the dissolution of the company.4 Both companies could have transferred their assets
and liabilities to a new company in France and receive shares in the new company when
Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc are liquidated. The necessary agreement of all of Hoechst’s
creditors makes this alternative risky. The liquidation would also lead to taxation of hid-
den reserves at the new company level and to capital tax for the new shares at the share-
holder level. Abstaining from the liquidation would not result in the desired single share
structure. It would also create a pyramid structure that would give Hoechst shareholders
– who would hold 53 % in the new company – control rights that are disproportionate to
their cash flow rights. Thus, this alternative would not effect the desired merger between
equals.
If the SE had been available Aventis could have been formed directly by the combination
of Hoechst’s and Rhône’s assets subject to the approval of both companies’ shareholders
in the General Meeting. There would be no risk that minority shareholders of Hoechst or
Rhône remain in Aventis as the two companies would cease to exist. Aventis SE could
easily locate in any of the EAA or EU member states and decide upon its board structure.
3Curiously, it was possible for Chrysler – a non EU company – and German Daimler in 1999 to merge and have
a single shareholder structure (Baums, 1999).
4Germany and France follow the “real seat theory” which requires a company to have its seat and place of
registration at the same location.
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Choice of board structure In many countries in the EU, public limited liability companies
cannot choose whether the company is represented by a board of directors (one-tier sys-
tem) or a management board and a supervisory board (two-tier system). The SE enables
the general meeting to decide upon the board structure.
Free negotiation of worker involvement Worker involvement is mandatory in many EU coun-
tries. In some EU countries employees must be represented on the board of directors or
the supervisory board. Often the laws for worker involvement are rigid. In Germany, for
example, public limited-liability companies with more than 20,000 employees must have
20 supervisory board members of which 10 are employee representatives. These repre-
sentatives represent the interest of the workers in the country where participation laws are
enforced (in the example above Germany). In contrast, the SE allows for a flexible form
of worker involvement. Upon formation of an SE the management negotiates with its EU
/ EEA employees how they are going to be involved in the SE. Involvement consists of
information, consultation and participation. Information is the timely supply of informa-
tion about the SE and its subsidiaries to the employees. Consultation gives employees
the right to establish a dialogue with and express their opinion before the management
of the SE. Participation comprises the right to elect or appoint some of the members
of the supervisory board / board of directors or to oppose or recommend some or all
of the members of the supervisory board / board of directors. How much involvement
employees can demand depends on the level of involvement that was present before the
company adopted the SE. In contrast to the provisions in national laws, all employees of
the company or its representatives within the EU / EEA participate in negotiations about
worker involvement. Negotiations are between the Special Negotiating Body (SNB) and
the management of the company. The SNB is presented by employees from all EU coun-
tries in which the company has employees. The more of the company’s employees work
in a country the more seats the country gets in the SNB. Decisions within the SNB are
reached with a double majority – at least half of the workforce that represents at least half
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of the countries.
Since 15 December 2007, when the Cross Border Directive5 had to be transposed into law,
European limited liability companies do not need the SE to effect cross border mergers anymore.
Instead, limited liability companies can merge without change in legal form subject to similar
requirements regarding worker involvement as the SE. Therefore, the SE might have lost some
of its attraction.
In summary, SEs enjoy greater cross border mobility and are more flexible with respect to
their corporate governance structure and worker involvement.
3.2 Hypotheses development
In this section I formulate 9 hypotheses. Except for the first hypothesis, all hypotheses link
changes that the SE entails to shareholder value. On the one hand, managers can use the SE’s
advantages over existing domestic legal forms to generate value. But if managers do not act in
the interest of shareholders they can use the SE to destroy value by weakening their monitoring
and entrench themselves. Moreover, majority shareholders could destroy value by using the SE
to their advantage at the cost of minority shareholders.
I expect that on average managers will use the SE to shareholder’s advantage:
HYPOTHESIS 1:
Companies that become SEs experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement
date.
Because transformation into a SE must be approved by shareholders, I hypothesize that
on average companies will only become SEs if shareholders value this change in legal form.
Moreover, if managers are incentivized to increase shareholder value by their compensation
contracts (Kaplan, 1994; Jenter and Kanaan, 2008) they will only propose to change the legal
form if it is beneficial for shareholders. How does the SE channel value?
First, the SE can generate value through cheaper cross border mergers. Although ordinary
5Directive 2005/56/EF from 26 October 2005.
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companies can easily acquire another EU company, it is costly to integrate the company’s op-
erations into their existing business structures because minority shareholders of the acquired
company can hold up the integration. But if companies merge, at least one company ceases
to exist and thus there is no hold up. The SE offers cross border mergers if the majorities of
the shareholders of all involved companies agree. In contrast, in order to prevent holdup by
minority shareholders, an ordinary company must freeze out the remaining shareholders of the
acquired firm, a costly process that is not available in all EU member states. In addition, the
SE, through its European image, can overcome national sentiment that would otherwise prevent
a cross border merger. For example, in the acquisition negotiations between German MAN
and the Swedish Scania, the parties considered that the new company’s headquarters should be
located in a “neutral” country or that the new company should be a SE (Handelsblatt, 2007).
Lenoir (2007) cites an estimate by the European Commission in 1995 that SE cross border
reorganizations save 30 EUR billion annually.
Easier cross border reorganizations cannot only save costs but increase overall cross border
activity because reorganizations that were too costly before the SE can now be profitable. More
cross border mergers, however, can destroy value if managers build empires or acquire because
of hubris. Hence, becoming an SE could decrease shareholder value if managers do not act
in shareholder’s interest. Recent European evidence is equivocal about the question whether
cross border mergers create significant abnormal returns for the acquirer. Campa and Hernando
(2004) find no significant returns. In contrast, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find significant
abnormal returns of up to 3.09 %.
Another possibility for the SE to generate value is its ability to change its seat. The SE
can exploit the most favorable legal system within the EU and therefore choose the legislation
that is best for shareholder value. For example Ahern and Dittmar (2010) provide evidence that
Norwegian companies changed their domicile in response to mandatory quotas of women on
corporate boards. Even in the absence of differences in legislation, the SE can benefit from
externalities if it locates close to other companies or its customers (e.g. lower search costs for
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recruitment, lower distance to customers).6 Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) provide evidence
that US headquarters relocate to areas that have both more employment and more headquarters
in the relocating headquarter’s industry than other areas.
On the other hand, relocation can also result in laws that are unfavorable for shareholders.
For example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) find that US states that have antitakeover statutes
attract more companies than states which do not have these statutes. The high shareholder
majorities, however, that managers need for relocation makes it unlikely that companies will
relocate to countries that have unfavorable shareholder laws. But relocation could still lead to
conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. These conflicts are mitigated
by provisions in the SE regulation that protect minority shareholders and that most member
states have introduced.7
Even, if a SE does not change its domicile immediately, its legal form puts it into a position
to act swiftly if the legal environment in its home country changes unfavorably. The SE’s credi-
ble threat to relocate increases its power to lobby the government for favorable laws. Therefore,
the SE is more valuable for industries that owe their profitability to special legislation that is
likely to change in the future. To highlight this point, consider this quotation from Solon SE’s
annual report (2008); Solon SE is a producer of photovoltaics that subsequently became a SE
(p. 57):
The solar industry is highly dependent on government subsidies, investors and
lendors. Without subsidies, photovoltaics would not be profitable in most countries,
particularly photovoltaics involving grid-connected systems. Therefore, a reduction
or elimination of subsidies in the markets of relevance to SOLON could lead to a
significant decline in sales.
This reasoning about relocation leads to the second hypothesis:
6Closeness to its customers was the reason Elcoteq put forward to change its domicile from Finland to Luxem-
bourg. Tax reasons were the motive behind James Hardie’s move from The Netherlands to Ireland.
7The SE regulation explicitly encourages member states to protect minority shareholders when a SE changes
its seat (Council Regulation No 2157/2001 Article 8 No. 5).
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HYPOTHESIS 2:
Companies that operate in industries regulated by laws that are likely to change unfavorably
in the future experience higher abnormal returns around the announcement day than SEs that
operate in other industries.
The SE can also change shareholder value through choice of its board structure, a choice
that is not available in most European legislations. The SE can choose a board that consists of
one board of directors that manages and monitors the company (one-tier structure) or of a man-
agement board that manages the company together with a supervisory board that monitors the
management board (two-tier structure). The SE regulation rules that the board of directors in
the one-tier board structure “shall manage the SE”. In most EU countries the board of directors
can elect “managing directors” that are “responsible for the day-to-day management” of the SE.
SE legislation in the member states differs in the extent that “managing directors” may serve
on the board of directors. For example in Germany, the majority of board members must not
be “managing directors”. In Austria no “managing director” may serve on the board. In the
two-tier board structure no member of the management board must at the same time serve on
the supervisory board. Thus, the two functions of the board, management and monitoring, are
separated in the two-tier board structure while they are combined in the one-tier board structure.
What board structure generates more shareholder value? In Adams and Ferreira’s 2007 model,
the optimal choice of board structure depends on the CEO’s private benefits. If private benefits
are high shareholders choose the dual board structure and if private benefits are low sharehold-
ers choose the one-tier board structure. In the model the board’s collaboration with the CEO
in management provides information for better monitoring. The CEO has private benefits and
therefore dislikes being monitored but the CEO also benefits from the advise of the board. A
more independent board would monitor the CEO stronger, but at the same time discourage the
CEO from collaboration with the board, which could therefore weaken monitoring overall. Be-
cause of the separation between management and monitoring in the two-tier board structure, the
supervisory board of the two-tier board structure can never exploit information from collabora-
tion with the CEO. The one-tier board, however, cannot commit to neglect for monitoring the
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information gleaned from collaboration. Therefore, if the CEO has high private benefits he will
never collaborate with the board and therefore he will never get advise that is valuable to both
him and the shareholders.
Adams and Ferreira’s 2007 model implies that one-tier boards tend to have members that
depend on the CEO whereas supervisory boards are always independent. Empirical studies
document that shareholders value outside directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) document
positive returns upon the appointment of an outside director and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010)
document negative returns upon the sudden death of an outside director. Byrd and Hickman
(1992) provides evidence that boards with more independent directors help make better acqui-
sition decisions and Weisbach (1988) documents that CEOs that report to boards with more
outside directors have a higher probability to be fired after bad performance. Core et al. (1999)
documents that companies with a higher fraction of outside directors have higher market-to-
book ratios.8
Since the factors that determine the choice of a board’s composition could be correlated
with shareholder value it is difficult to predict, based on the empirical studies, how a change
in the board structure that follows SE adoption will affect shareholder value. For example,
if the CEO’s private benefits are low, her actions are better aligned with that of shareholders
and therefore shareholder value is higher. At the same time, in Adams and Ferreira’s 2007
model, shareholders choose a more independent board. Cross sectionally shareholder value
and board independence are positively correlated, however, increasing board independence in
each firm decreases shareholder value because shareholders choose board structure optimally
(see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2010, for a discussion of this endogeneity
problem).
Instead of the shareholders choosing the board members, management could choose board
members. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) provide evidence that CEOs can influence the selec-
tion process of board members. Board members that are selected by the CEO could act more in
8Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) do not find a significant relation between Tobin’s q and fraction of outside
directors.
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the management’s interest that can be opposed to the interest of shareholders. Hence, changes
to the board could decrease shareholder value. On the other hand, SE adoption affords high
shareholder majorities. Therefore also board changes following SE adoption are subject to high
voting requirements. These high majorities can prevent board changes that are unfavorable to
shareholders.
In the absence of a clear prediction of the effect on shareholder value of a change from the
two-tier board structure to the one-tier board structure, I settle with the working hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3:
Companies that change their management structure from two-tier to one-tier exhibit negative
announcement returns.
The SE offers free contracting of labor relations that can alleviate the negative impact on
performance of rigid labour laws (Gorton and Schmid, 2004). Among European countries,
Germany’s worker involvement laws are the most extensive. I hypothesize that:
HYPOTHESIS 4:
German companies exhibit higher abnormal returns than companies from other European Union
/ European Economic Area countries when they announce to become an SE.
A SE’s worker involvement provisions are the outcome of contracting between the com-
pany’s workers and its management. A contracting solution offers the opportunity to tailor an
agreement to worker’s and management’s needs. Thus, the contracting solution might make
both parties better off compared to a solution provided by rigid labour laws. Jensen and Meck-
ling (1979) argue that a board that (partly) consists of workers should underperform companies
that can choose the members of their boards freely. Otherwise, companies would voluntar-
ily appoint workers on their boards. In line with this argument, Faleye et al. (2006) find that
companies that are controlled through an equity stake of their workers have lower valuations.
HYPOTHESIS 5:
German SEs that reduce the supervisory board size exhibit positive abnormal returns.
Large supervisory board sizes that are imposed upon a company by law might not lead to an
optimal trade off between coordination costs and the benefits of supervision. German worker
involvement law rules that the supervisory board size has to increase once a company’s German
workforce reaches certain thresholds. For example, a German public company with more than
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20,000 employees must have 20 supervisory board members.9 In contrast, the General Meet-
ing chooses the size of the supervisory board in a German SE.10 Yermack (1996) and Coles
et al. (2008) find that companies that have smaller boards perform better financially. However,
companies in complex businesses profit from a larger board size whereas companies in simple
businesses loose (Coles et al., 2008). As there is no a priori reason to believe that companies
that become SEs operate in more complex / simple markets I hypothesize that a reduction in
supervisory board size leads to an increase in shareholder wealth.
HYPOTHESIS 6:
The abnormal return from announcing to become a SE is greater for German companies ruled
by the “Mitbestimmungsgesetz”.
Among the different worker involvement laws in Germany the “Mitbestimmungsgesetz” is
one of the strictest. It prescribes that half of the members of the supervisory board must be
worker representatives. Gorton and Schmid (2004) find that companies ruled by “Mitbestim-
mungsgesetz” have lower valuations. Thus companies, ruled by this law should benefit more
from becoming an SE.
HYPOTHESIS 7:
The less concentrated the European workers of a company the higher are the abnormal returns
it experiences upon announcement to become a SE.
Even though there are European trade union bodies, there is some anecdotal evidence that
trade unions are still national bodies that represent national worker interests. Management
might try to exploit this thanks to the worker involvement of all European employees in an
SE. For example if a German SE with French and German members on the supervisory board
decides to close a factory in Germany and build a new one in France this will lead to conflicts
amongst the worker representatives. In such a situation it is easier for the shareholder represen-
tatives of the supervisory board to achieve needed majorities as opposed to a situation where the
supervisory board consists of German worker representatives only. The potential to play off the
9Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer §7 para. 1 no. 3. For companies in some sectors of the
heavy industry there are other rulings. See Addison and Schnabel (2011) for a more comprehensive treatment of
German codetermination.
10SE-Ausführungsgesetz §16 and 17. These rulings also prescribe an upper limit to the supervisory board size
and demand the size has to be divisible by 3.
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worker participants against each other will be the greater the more the nationalities of worker
representatives differ on the supervisory board.
On the other hand, workers can function as monitors. If workers are effective monitors,
shareholder / management agency conflicts can increase if worker’s power is impaired. This
will work against Hypothesis 7.
Last, managers can use the adoption of the SE to introduce changes to the statutes that serve
their own interest. I hypothesize that:
HYPOTHESIS 8:
German companies that extend tenure of management or supervisory boards or introduce veto
powers for their CEOs have lower abnormal returns upon announcement of their decision to
become a SE.
The rules that govern SEs allow the supervisory and management board to have six years
of tenure. In contrast, German members of both boards can have only five year contracts.
Longer contracts make it more costly for shareholders to replace members of the supervisory
and management board when they perform poorly. For companies that are ruled by “Mitbestim-
mungsgesetz” it was impossible to introduce a veto for the CEO. In SEs a CEO veto is possible.
A CEO that vetoes decisions that decrease her private benefits of control but increase share-
holder value is more harmful to shareholders than a CEO who does not have this power. This
reasoning leads to Hypothesis 8.
3.3 Description of registered SEs and final sample
I identify companies from http://www.worker-participation.eu which is managed by the
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI).11 The ETUI uses the Official Journal of the European
Union, where member states must record new SE registrations, and it uses its country experts
to learn about SE registrations. The ETUI website provides information about the name of
the company, the country where the company is registered, date of registration, board structure
11The ETUI is part of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) which is the umbrella organisation of
trade unions within the EU.
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(one-tier / two-tier) and various variables concerning worker involvement. The data is often
incomplete. So, the sample sizes underlying the figures and tables in this section vary. I stop
collecting data in November 2010.
Figure 3.1 depicts the number of SE registrations from the last quarter of 2004 to the fourth
quarter of 2010. The figure documents that SE registrations increase over time. The slight
decrease in the fourth quarter of 2010 is an artifact of the incomplete data collection in this
quarter. By mid November 2010 there are 624 registered SEs. The increase shows that there is
a steady interest in choosing the SE.
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Figure 3.1: Cumulated number of SE registrations per quarter
This figure displays the cumulated number of SE registrations in the EU and the EAA from the fourth quarter of
2004 through the fourth quarter of 2010.
Figure 3.2 depicts the number of SE registrations by country. The number of SE registra-
tions is scaled by new public and private limited companies registrations during the time that
the first SE registered until the last SE registered in a country.12 Although, the numbers must
12New private and publicly limited company registrations are from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
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be interpreted carefully because the SE , a public limited company, is compared to private and
public limited companies, it is clear from the figure that the majority of limited companies are
not SEs. In particular, assuming that 2 % of all limited companies are public limited companies
(the figure for Germany in 2009) only about 4 % of German public limited company registra-
tions were SEs. Overall Cyprus has the highest proportion of SE registrations, closely followed
by the Czech Republic. Luxembourg, Germany and Austria come next and the remaining coun-
tries in the figure have about the same level of SE registrations. Greece, Italy, Romania, Finland
and Iceland have no SE registrations. Figure 3.2 also suggests that countries ruled by participa-
tion laws attract more SEs. This relationship is not monotone, however, as companies with no
participation laws tend to have relatively more SEs than countries with participation laws only
for state-owned companies.
The ETUI categorizes SEs into four categories: normal, shelf, empty and UFO. Normal
SEs have a clear business purpose and have employees. Shelf SEs are established to be sold to
buyers that do not want to lose time on the legal registration process. Empty companies lack
employees. Last, UFO SEs lack information to classify them in any of the foregoing categories.
Figure 3.3 depicts the number of SE registrations by category and country. From the figure,
most normal SEs are in Central and Western Europe. Most normal SEs are in Germany. To a
lesser extend normal SEs are in Eastern Europe, the Scandinavian countries (with the exception
of Norway) and the U.K.. Cyprus is an outlier with most of the normal SEs relative to new
limited liability registrations. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that the Czech Republic, that hosts the
second highest number relative to new company registrations and the highest total number of
SEs, has a large number of shelf, empty and UFO SEs. Most of the SEs in Luxembourg do not
have any employees (often these SEs are in the financial service industry).
In order to test the hypotheses of the previous section, I identify two subsamples within the
ETUI population. The first subsample are publicly listed companies. In addition to established
When data is missing I extrapolate the last year with data to future years without data. New registrations are for
service and industrial firms only. Ireland has 10, Liechtenstein has 4 and Poland has 2 SEs. The countries are not
depicted in Figure 3.2 because Eurostat provides no data on new limited liability company registrations for them.
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Figure 3.2: SE registrations by country
This figure displays the number of SE registrations in the EU and the EAA by countries. The numbers are scaled
by new company registrations of limited liability companies in the country from the date that the first SE registered
until the last SE registered. Ireland, Liechtenstein and Poland have registered SEs, however, no information on
new company registrations is available. Therefore, these countries are excluded from the figure.
SEs, I also include companies that have announced their intention to become an SE and are in
the process of transforming or abandoned their plans to become SEs. These planned and aban-
doned SEs are also on ETUI’s homepage. Irrespective of whether SE adoption is completed,
planned or abandoned I refer to the company as SE. I find 57 SEs that are publicly listed. Five
of these SEs were SEs when they listed, one is a closed end fund and one is a cash shell. I can-
not find data in DATASTREAM for two SEs. Hence, I exclude these SEs from further analysis.
Announcement dates are collected from DGAP, Bundesanzeiger (for German SEs), EuroAd-
hoc and http://www.newsweb.no (for Norwegian SEs) and ETUI’s homepage because ETUI
claims to have some of its information from internal sources. I also search FACTIVA and the
SE’s homepage. If I find announcements on Factiva that are earlier than the other sources I use
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Figure 3.3: SE registration by category and country
This figure displays the number of SE registrations in the EU and the EAA by country and category. Normal SEs
have a clear business purpose and have employees. Shelf SEs are established to be sold to buyers that do not want
to go through the legal registration process. Empty companies lack employees. UFO SEs lack information to
classify them in any of the previous categories.
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the FACTIVA date. I am able to find announcement dates for all but one of the remaining 48
SEs. This leaves me with 47 SEs to analyse. Table 3.9 in the Appendix gives an overview of
the announcement dates and their source. Events surrounding the announcement day are also in
Table 3.9. These events indicate considerable noise in the event window. Unfortunately, some
SEs release additional information when they announce their transformation to an SE. The rows
containing these SEs are in grey. In the remainder of this paper I will make a distinction be-
tween the full sample and the clean sample, which excludes SEs with multiple announcements
on the event day. The clean sample consists of 29 SEs.
The second subsample consists of all SEs that have a web presence and have a WORLD-
SCOPE identifier. For this sample of listed and non-listed SEs, I draw a control group of EU
/ EAA companies matched on four digit standard industry classification code from WORLD-
SCOPE.
Accounting and price data is from WORLDSCOPE and DATASTREAM, respectively.13 I use
exchange rates from the European Central Bank to convert all prices and accounting numbers
to Euros.
Starting with the second subsample, Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics of accounting
data for listed and non-listed SEs in the registration year. There are 48 listed and non-listed SEs
with complete data. The Table shows, that SEs are larger and less profitable than the control
sample of EU companies matched on industry (significant at the 2 % level for testing difference
in means and medians).
For listed SEs, I also collect data from SEs’ conversion or merger reports.14 In particular,
I record the motives of companies to become SEs, the mode of formation (merger / conversion
/ subsidiary / holding), whether the company changes its board structure, the formation costs,
13For a few German SEs that have missing data in WORLDSCOPE I use data from http://www.
unternehmensregister.de, an official source for financial statement data.
14Article 20 of the SE regulation rules that a company’s management has to draw up draft terms of merger.
These have to be approved by the general meeting (Article 23). Article 37 par. 4 rules that the report must be
“explaining and justifying the legal and economic aspects of the conversion and indicating the implications for the
shareholders and for the employees of the adoption of the form of a SE. “ The SE regulation provides the minimum
for the publication requirements of SEs as member states can impose additional requirements.
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Table 3.1: Accounting numbers for the publicly listed SE sample
This table contains descriptive statistics for return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and total assets for
SEs and a control group matched on industry and country in the year that the company becomes a SE.
SEs Control
ROA TAa ROA TAa
Min -0.13 120 0.00 24
Q25 0.01 319,615 0.01 35,600
Q50 0.03 941,950 0.04 149,280
AVG 0.03 2.7e+07 0.08 1.9e+07
Q75 0.06 5,160,705 0.08 1,274,383
MAX 0.18 1e+09 11.26 1.3e+09
N 48 48 655 655
a EUR (Thousands)
the composition of workers in the SNB and whether the SE announces its intention to change
its seat. The conversion or merger report is considerably more detailed for German SEs than
for other SEs.15 For this reason the data that I can collect for German SEs are more detailed.
Specifically, for German companies only, I collect the change in the number of supervisory
board members, the worker involvement law that rules the company, whether the tenure for
the management or supervisory board is extended and whether the CEO can veto decisions in
the SE. Pursuant to German law, members of the (management or supervisory) board can only
have five year contracts. SE law, in contrast, allows board members to have six year contracts.
Similarly, German companies that are ruled by “Mitbestimmungsgesetz” must have a board
member that is responsible for work and social matters.16 This member is on equal footing with
the CEO. Therefore it is not possible to introduce a CEO veto in a German company ruled by
“Mitbestimmungsgesetz”. The sample sizes in the tables that follow vary with the level of detail
from the conversion or merger plans.
15A German conversion or merger report usually consists of well over 100 pages, whereas that of other compa-
nies consists of about ten pages. The exception is NYSE listed James Hardie SE, located in the Netherlands, that
publishes more than 800 pages.
16§33 Mitbestimmungsgesetz .
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Table 3.2 displays the number of publicly listed SEs in the renewable energy and gambling
industries, the number of SEs that are formed by merger versus conversion and the number
of SEs in different member states. All 6 SEs that are in the renewable energy industry are
registered in Germany. These SEs rely on state subsidies that make renewable energy attractive.
Also the 3 companies in the (online) gambling industry are sensitive to regulation that threatens
to ban their operation (The Economist, 2009). Altogether about 19 % of the companies are in
the gambling or renewable energy industries. This significant percentage suggests that the SE
attracts companies that operate in industries that are particularly exposed to law changes. Most
of the publicly listed SEs are formed by conversion (80 %) – 20 % are formed by merger. Hence,
none of the publicly listed SEs are formed as a holding or subsidiary. Most of the mergers that
form a SE are with wholly owned subsidiaries.17 The overwhelming majority of publicly listed
SEs are in Germany. There are 20 member states that do not host any publicly listed SEs. The
column labelled “SC_TO” indicates the number of SEs that were first registered in a different
member state and subsequently changed their seat to the country indicated in the row. About
13 % of the companies subsequently changed their seat.18 The most attractive destinations are
Cyprus and Luxembourg.
Table 3.3 lists the stated motives to become an SE. As SEs state more than one motive in
their conversion or merger reports, rows labelled “All motives” can contain the same company
multiple times. In contrast, the rows labelled “First motive” only contain the motive that ap-
pears first in a SE’s conversion or merger report. The vast majority of SEs state that they want to
emphasize their European or international image. This motive is puzzling because the improve-
ment of the European image could be achieved cheaper by a simple name change for example.
The second most frequent motive relates to the economic advantages of the SE. Some motives
17Only Allianz and Songa Offshore do not hold 100 % in the companies with which they subsequently merge.
Allianz holds 55.4 % and Songa Offshore holds 99.65 % at the day of the announcement.
18Two of those companies are Norwegian firms that relocate to Cyprus for tax reasons. One company, Betbull,
is an English Plc that has most of its business in Austria and wants to relocate there. James Hardie, registered in
the Netherlands, moves to Ireland for tax purposes. Elcoteq relocates from Finland to Luxembourg to be closer to
its customers and Fotex Holding SE relocates to Luxembourg for unknown reasons.
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Table 3.2: Number of SEs by industry, mode of formation and country
This table contains the number of SEs within industries that are sensitive to changes in legislation, the number
of SEs that are formed by merger versus conversion and the number of SEs in different member states. The
column labelled “SC_TO” indicates the number of SEs that were registered in a different member state first and
subsequently changed their seat to the country indicated in the row.
Country Count SC_TO Established Count Industry Count
Germany 29 0 Conversion 37 Other 38
France 4 0 Merger 9 Renewable energy 6
Austria 3 1 Gambling 3
Cyprus 2 2
Luxembourg 2 2
Norway 2 0
The Netherlands 2 0
Belgium 1 0
Ireland 1 1
Sweden 1 0
are rather vague such as cost savings or improved flexibility.19 Many motives relate to corporate
governance issues. The most frequent corporate governance motive is that SEs want to give all
their workers (as opposed to only the domestic workers) a voice in the company affairs. Some
companies state that they want to keep their proven corporate governance system. The SE en-
sures that they can keep their supervisory board size because if they continued as a conventional
public limited company, worker involvement laws would force them to have larger supervisory
boards.
Table 3.4 depicts the frequency of different worker participation laws among German pub-
licly listed SEs. Most of the German SEs (50 %) do not have labor participation in the board.20
31 % of German SEs are ruled by the strongest worker participation law – MitbestG1976. 19 %
of German SEs are ruled by the One Third Act that requires that a third of the members of
19Some companies give hints where cost savings could come from. Companies that merge with a wholly owned
subsidiary state that they can save on the redundant board of the subsidiary. Companies also expect less legal and
administrative costs when they turn subsidiaries into branches.
20No participation law rules the company Surteco. Yet it applies the One Third Act on a voluntary basis. It is
coded as having no participation law.
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Table 3.3: Stated motives to become a SE
This table lists the frequency of motives that SEs mention in their conversion or merger reports to become a SE.
Rows labelled “All motives” contain all motives recorded in a SE’s conversion or merger report. In consequence,
these rows can contain the same SE multiple times. The rows labelled “First motive” contain the frequency of
motives that appear first in the conversion or merger report.
Motive Count
All motives:
European / international image 21
Possibility to relocate 11
Involvement of all European workers 9
One-tier board structure 6
Reduction of supervisory board size 6
Better corporate governance 5
Cost savings 4
Future expansion 4
Higher cross border mobility 4
Improved flexibility 3
Easier recruitment of international staff 2
Attraction to investors 2
Tax reasons 2
Internationalization 2
Enhancing competitiveness 1
Evade MitbestG 1
Admission to Austrian stock exchange 1
Develop corporate governance structure 1
Faster and more precise information of markets 1
Optimize work of board 1
Having only one financial regulator 1
Let directors be closer to market 1
Reduction of management team 1
Increase in core capital 1
Inreased attention 1
1st motive:
European / international image 18
Possibility to relocate 5
One-tier board structure 4
Higher cross border mobility 2
Internationalization 2
Better corporate governance 1
Cost savings 1
Improved flexibility 1
Having only one financial regulator 1
Future expansion 1
62
the supervisory board are labour representatives. Table 3.4 also lists the frequency of different
statute changes for German companies when they become SEs. The majority of SEs does not
strengthen the CEOs power by granting him a veto. But many SEs do not change the default in
SE law that vests the CEO with a tie breaking vote. Whereas the majority of German SEs does
not increase the possible tenure of its management board, most of German SEs make it possible
for their supervisory board members to have six year contracts. “Possible” means that a longer
tenure is the exception. 36 % of SEs explicitly prohibit longer tenures and 18 % of German SEs
make a longer tenure the default.
18 % of companies reduce the size of their supervisory board. This figure likely understates
the desire of companies to control the supervisory board size because companies can preempt
future supervisory board increases by becoming SEs. Indeed, some companies state that they
want to preempt future supervisory board increases with the formation of a SE.21
For all German and non-German SEs with available data Table 3.4 also reports the number
of SEs that change their board structure and the number of SEs that announce to relocate. Three
SEs announce their intention to change their seat in the merger or conversion report. Among all
SEs with information in the conversion or merger report, 26 % change their board structure. In
all the cases the change is from two-tier to one-tier board structure. I can collect data for board
composition following the proposed change from two-tier to one-tier board for 8 companies.
In all companies but one the former CEO of the two-tier board is a member of the one-tier
board. In all cases but one the majority of the one-tier board is made up of former members of
the supervisory board. I can collect complete data on board structure change and the stake of
the largest blockholder in the SE for 24 SEs. If blockholder stake proxies for private benefits
of control then Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that the one-tier structure can be optimal for
companies with smaller blockholder stakes. In the 5 SEs that change their board structure and
have data on blockholder stake, the largest blockholder holds on average 31.6 % of outstanding
21Two companies – Porsche and Fresenius – state that without the formation of a SE they would have to increase
their supervisory boards from 12 to 20. Porsche and Fresenius appear as a zero change in supervisory board size
in Table 3.4.
63
Table 3.4: Frequency of different changes to the statutes of German companies
This table lists the frequency of the different worker participation laws among German SEs. The table also presents
the frequency of different changes in the corporate governance of the SEs as well as the number of SEs that
announce to change their seat at the same time that they announce their intention to become a SE.
German SEs German SEs German SEs All SEs
Tenure MB Count Tenure SB Count Veto Count Relocation Count
FALSE 21 POSSIBLE 10 FALSE 22 FALSE 26
POSSIBLE 4 FALSE 8 TRUE 3 TRUE 3
DEFAULT 3 DEFAULT 4
German SEs German SEs German SEs All SEs
Breaking
Count
Participation
Count
Reduction
Count
Change board
Count
vote law SB structure
TRUE 20 None 13 FALSE 18 FALSE 26
FALSE 5 MitbestG1976 8 TRUE 4 TRUE 9
One-Third Act 5
shares. In contrast, in SEs that keep their board structure the largest blockholder holds on
average 41.6 %. The difference is not significant, however.
Table 3.5 shows summary statistics of formation costs and the concentration of nationalities
in the special negotiating body (SNB). The SNB represents EU workers of a company upon
formation of a SE. Concentration is measured by the Gini coefficient. A Gini coefficient of
1 means that all seats are represented by one nationality. In contrast, a Gini coefficient of 0
indicates that the European countries are equally represented within the SNB. Comparing the
formation costs with the distribution of total assets in Table 3.1, that depicts accounting data for
all SEs (listed or not), shows that formation costs are negligible. The most expensive formation
is Allianz that comprised the merger with a subsidiary that it did not wholly own. The Gini
coefficient is spread around a median of 0.52. There is a tendency for a SE’s workforce to
concentrate in one EU country as signified by the mean of 0.59.
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Table 3.5: Formation costs and concentration of nationalities in the SNB
This table depicts summary statistics for the formation costs of a SE and the Gini coefficient that measures the
concentration of nationalities in the SNB. Formation costs are in thousand EUR.
Cost Con-
THD EUR centration
MIN 30 0.00
Q25 238 0.34
Q50 800 0.52
AVG 7,026 0.59
Q75 3,000 0.87
MAX 95,000 0.97
3.4 Evidence on the hypotheses
On average there are no significant abnormal returns when a company announces to become a
SE. Table 3.6 lists the mean of cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement
day for different event windows. Three tests test the significance of CARs. The ordinary T-test
(MacKinlay, 1997) (labelled “T”), the rank test (Corrado, 1989) (labelled “Rank”) and the sign
test (Corrado and Zivney, 1992) (labelled “Sign”). CARs and the test statistics are reported for
the whole and the clean sample. I use the market model to calculate abnormal returns. The event
windows are symmetric to capture rumors and information about the SE transformation that
diffuse before and after the announcement, respectively. All tests cannot reject the hypothesis
that there are no abnormal returns on average. In addition to the insignificance of returns, their
direction is inconclusive for the shortest event window. In the shortest event window, returns are
positive in the whole sample and negative in the clean sample. Over the longer event windows
returns are positive. The finding is consistent with that of Eidenmüller et al. (2010) who also
fail to find significant returns on average.
Figure 3.4, a time series plot of CARS, adds to the inconclusive findings. The plot shows
considerable variation in the event window. There is a negative trend that reaches a through
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Table 3.6: Announcement returns for companies that become SEs
This table lists the mean cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around companies’ announcement days to become
SEs for different event windows. The table also reports test statistics for the t-test (“T”), the rank test (“Rank”) and
the sign test (“Sign”).
Whole sample Clean sample
CAR T Rank Sign CAR T Rank Sign
[0;0] 0.04 0.08 0.46 0.44 -0.59 -1.00 -1.07 -0.93
[-1;1] 0.86 1.12 0.22 0.22
[-4;4] 1.87 1.41 0.72 0.40
[-9;9] 0.59 0.31 1.77 0.68
[-19;19] 1.34 0.48 0.48 0.13
six days before the event at a CAR of about -1.5 % (about -1 % for the clean sample) and then
a reverse in trend until the sixth day after the event. For the median company the conversion
/ merger plan is released 23 calendar days after the announcement and the general meeting to
decide on the adoption of the SE takes place 83 calendar days after the announcement. It is
therefore unlikely that these two events can explain the observed pattern.
In conclusion, I have to reject Hypothesis 1: There are no significant announcement returns
on average.
In order to test the remaining hypotheses I regress the CARs in the 3 day event window
on different covariates. One concern is that not all changes to the company that encompass
SE formation are released on the announcement day. Many companies, however, announce the
main changes that they want to implement when they announce their intention to become SEs.
Other companies have conference calls at the day of the announcement or one day thereafter.
To the extend that changes to the company following SE adoption are not released to the market
I loose power to find evidence for the hypotheses.
Table 3.7 provides support for Hypothesis 2. The size of the coefficient of 2.5 % on the
dummy variable “Regulated”, suggests that companies in regulated industries have on aver-
age 2.8 percentage points higher CARs (p-value: 0.051). Regulated industries are the online
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Figure 3.4: Cumulated abnormal returns for companies that become SEs
This figure displays cumulated abnormal returns for 47 companies that announce to become SEs over an event
window that starts 19 days prior to the announcement and ends 19 days thereafter. The solid line represents the full
sample and the dashed line represents companies that did not release any information, apart from their intention to
become SEs, on the announcement day (clean sample).
gambling and the renewable energy industry. As argued above, the companies in the online
gambling industry need a special permit to do business and face negative sentiment in some
EU countries. Companies in the renewable energy industry are all German and depend on state
subsidies that will decrease in the future. Therefore, the evidence supports the hypothesis that
relocation or the threat of relocation is more valuable for companies that operate in industries
that critically depend on state support.
Also Hypothesis 3 is supported by the evidence in Table 3.7. Companies that change their
board structure from two-tier to one-tier, indicated by the variable “Change structure”, have
on average 3.7 percentage points lower CARs. The effect is highly significant (p-value: 0.018).
This large negative effect is consistent with a weakening of the monitoring function of the board
67
Table 3.7: Regressions of cumulated abnormal returns on company characteristics
This table summarizes regressions of cumulated abnormal returns on company characteristics for companies that
announce to become SEs. Company characteristics are: “Change structure” an indicator that is 1 if the SE changed
its board structure from two-tier to one-tier and zero otherwise, “log(TA)” the logarithm of total assets, “Regu-
lated” an indicator that is 1 if the company operates in the online gambling or renewable energy industry and zero
otherwise, “Germany” an indicator that is 1 if the company is located in Germany and zero otherwise, “Reduction”
an indicator variable that is 1 if the SE reduced its board size, “One-Third Act” an indicator that is 1 if the SE is
governed by the One Third Act and zero otherwise, “MitbestG1976” an indicator that is 1 if the SE is governed
by the Mitbestimmungsgesetz, “Concentration” the Gini coefficient of workers in the Special Negotiating Body
and “Entrenchment” an indicator variable that is 1 if the CEO can veto decisions or if the tenure of the board has
been extended from 5 to 6 years. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the coefficient estimates in
the respective row above. N is the number of observations in the regression. Significance codes are: • ∼ 10 %, ∗ ∼
5 %, ∗∗ ∼ 1 % , ∗∗∗ ∼< 1 %.
Dependent variable:
Variable CAR[-1;1]
Constant 0.007 -0.012 -0.006 -0.027 -0.090 -0.028 0.032 0.002
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.068) (0.068) (0.038) (0.060) (0.029)
Change -0.037∗ -0.035∗
structure (0.015) (0.016)
log(TA) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Reg- 0.028∗ 0.010
ulated (0.014) (0.016)
Germany 0.006
(0.013)
Re- -0.029
duction (0.028)
One-Third 0.006
Act (0.025)
MitbestG -0.028
1976 (0.030)
Con- 0.008
centration (0.026)
Entrench- -0.009
ment (0.018)
R2adj 13.53 % 5.72 % -3.38 % -4.35 % 0.95 % -3.86 % -9.34 % 11.60 %
N 32 42 42 22 24 27 21 32
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following the change from the two to one-tier structure.
In contrast, there is no support for the remaining hypotheses. Although German compa-
nies have on average larger abnormal returns than other EU firms the effect is insignificant
(p-value: 0.622). Inconsistent with Hypothesis 5, German companies that reduce their board
size have lower abnormal returns, but the effect is not significant.22 One reason for the in-
significance might be, that there are only 22 companies in this regression and therefore there
is little power to reliably estimate any effects. Companies ruled by the strictest participation
law, “MitbestG1976”, have lower but insignificant CARs. This observation is inconsistent with
Hypothesis 6. One explanation for the finding of no different CARS for German companies or
companies with different worker participation laws is the pricing of these effects long before the
announcement day. If investors anticipated, at the time that the SE regulation was published,
that the regulation will have a differential impact for German companies or companies governed
by “Mitbestimmungsgesetz” then I should not find any abnormal returns on the announcement
day.
The coefficient on the Gini coefficient (“Concentration”) is positive which implies that the
higher the concentration of the European workforce the higher the abnormal returns. This
result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 7. Companies that increase the tenure of their boards or
introduce a veto for their CEOs (“entrenchment”) have on average 1 % lower CARs consistent
with Hypothesis 8. The negative effect cannot be estimated with enough confidence, however.
In the last column of Table 3.7, I combine the industry membership and board structure change
indicators in a multiple regression. All coefficients keep the same sign, however, the industry
effect becomes insignificant. The insignificance of the industry effect is driven by lack of power
as there is also no significant effect in a simple regressions of CARs on industry effects and the
logarithm of total assets in the same sample of 35 companies that has complete observations on
“Change structure”.
In order to shed more light on Hypothesis 1 I use a sample of listed and non-listed SEs and
22For the two companies, Fresenius and Porsche, the conversion to a SE prevents their obligation to increase the
board size. I treat these companies as if they reduced their board size
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compare their return on assets before the registration as a SE with those after SE registration.
In Table 3.8, “Registered” is an indicator that takes a value of 1 in the year of SE registration
and beyond and a value of zero otherwise. The earliest year in the sample is the year 2000.
The first two columns of Table 3.8 provide no evidence on any effect after registration. In
the first specification, “Registered” is negative and insignificant and in the second specification
“Registered” is positive and insignificant. Whereas in the first two columns of Table 3.8 SEs
serve as their own control group, in the last two columns the set of control firm years is extended
by EU / EAA companies that match the SE sample on SIC code. The row labelled “SE” reports
the average ROA of companies that subsequently become SEs. If “SE” is not included in the
regression the effect of SE registration is significantly negative and economically large at −4.7
percentage point. But if “SE” is included in the regression the effect of SE registration is
positive and insignificant. Since “SE” captures unobserved company characteristics of future
SEs I conclude that there is no significant registration effect but instead that future SEs have
unobserved characteristics that cause ROA to be lower than companies that do not become SEs.
The “SE” effect is significant and negative, indicating that SEs are already underperforming
before they become SEs. On average companies that subsequently become SEs have about 5 %
points lower return on assets. This effect is highly significant
In summary, the event study supports the hypothesis that SEs that change their board struc-
ture from two-tier to one-tier destroy shareholder value. There is some evidence that companies
that are sensitive to changing legislation, such as companies in the renewable energy industry,
benefit more from SE adoption than other companies. This finding is not robust over specifi-
cations and varying sample sizes. All other employee related hypotheses and the entrenchment
hypothesis have to be rejected. There is no robust evidence that listed and non-listed SEs have
different returns on assets after they become SEs. Instead, SEs are already underperforming
their peers before they become SEs.
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Table 3.8: Regressions of return on assets on event time and company characteristics
This table summarizes regressions of return on assets on event time and company characteristics. Return on assets
is net income divided by total assets. “Registered” is an indicator that is 1 in the year that a company becomes a
SE and thereafter and 0 before. “asinh(sales)” is the inverse hyperbolic sine of sales. “Debt” is total liabilities over
total assets. “SE” is an indicator that is 1 if the company subsequently becomes a SE and zero otherwise. The first
two columns of the table include only companies that become SEs. In contrast, the last two columns of the table
also includes EU / EAA companies that do not become SEs in the sample period and match the SIC codes of the
SE sample. The regression data spans years 2000 - 2009. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the
coefficient estimates in the respective row above. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level. N is the number
of observations in the regression. Significance codes: • ∼ 10 %, ∗ ∼ 5 %, ∗∗ ∼ 1 % , ∗∗∗ ∼< 1 %.
Dependent variable:
Variable ROA
Intercept 0.0190 -0.0003 -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗ 0.2003∗∗∗ 0.1982∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0757) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0501) (0.0502)
Registered -0.0272 0.0113 -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0058 -0.0472∗∗ 0.0019
(0.0333) (0.0178) (0.0143) (0.0216) (0.0156) (0.0211)
asinh(Sales) 0.0034 -0.0091• -0.0089•
(0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Debt -0.0493 0.0011 0.0013
(0.0741) (0.0081) (0.0079)
SE -0.0471∗ -0.0535∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0189)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2adj 3.72 % 3.56 % 3.28 % 3.53 % 4.36 % 4.65 %
N 404 347 6,397 6,397 6,305 6,305
3.5 Summary & Conclusions
The paper relates corporate governance changes to abnormal announcement returns of com-
panies that intend to become SEs. Companies that change their board structure from two-tier
to one-tier have significant lower announcement returns than companies that keep their board
structure. This finding conforms to the hypothesis that the SE can be used to weaken the moni-
toring function of the board.
The paper provides evidence that the ability of the SE to relocate is valuable for companies
that operate in industries that critically depend on state subsidies or special state permissions:
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Companies that operate in the renewable energy sector or in the online gambling industry have
higher abnormal returns.
The paper does not provide any evidence that the SE generates value through weakening
labors voice in the company affairs or through better tailored labor participation agreements.
Last, SEs have lower return on assets already before they become SEs. This finding indicates
that SEs are structurally different than their peers before the SE adoption decision. Future
research could explore this difference and relate it to the decision to become a SE.
72
3.A Announcement dates of SEs
Appendix
Table 3.9: Announcement dates and their source
This table depicts the dates on which sample companies announce their intention to become SEs (announcement date) and the source of the announcement date. Announce-
ments of other information surrounding the announcement date are also in the table. Table entries are sorted in ascending chronological order. Rows overlayed by grey
colour identify announcement dates on which there are multiple announcements.
Company Announcement date Other announcements Source
Nordea 2003-06-02 Divestiture of a business http://www.nordea.
com
Nordea 2003-06-04 Creation of a new division http://www.nordea.
com
Nordea 2003-06-19 Formation SE by merger http://www.nordea.
com
Nordea 2003-07-03 Merger of a polish subsidiary with another bank http://www.nordea.
com
Nordea 2003-07-04 Divestiture of a business http://www.nordea.
com
Elcoteq SE 2003-12-18 Preliminary release of net sales Hugin Press Release
Allianz SE 2005-09-07 Formation SE by merger Financial Times
Deutschland
Allianz SE 2005-09-08 Confirmation of earnings target, costs of hurri-
cane Katrina
DGAP
Mensch und Maschine Software SE 2005-11-02 Release third quarter financial report DGAP
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Company Announcement Date Other announcements Source
Mensch und Maschine Software SE 2005-11-04 Conversion SE Factiva (Süddeutsche
Zeitung)
Mensch und Maschine Software SE 2005-11-07 Director’s dealing DGAP
Mensch und Maschine Software SE 2005-11-09 Director’s dealing DGAP
Mensch und Maschine Software SE 2005-11-15 Director’s dealing DGAP
SCOR Group 2006-06-23 Release of financial data Company homepage
SCOR Group 2006-07-04 Conversion to SE Company homepage
Fresenius SE 2006-10-11 Conversion SE, stock split DGAP
Surteco SE 2006-10-12 Conversion SE DGAP
HIT International Trading AG 2006-11-06 Conversion SE DGAP
Prosafe SE 2006-11-17 Conversion SE, disclosure of share holdings http://www.
newsweb.no
Prosafe SE 2006-10-24 Acquisition of a vessel http://www.
newsweb.no
Prosafe SE 2006-11-07 Announcement of third quarter results http://www.
newsweb.no
Prosafe SE 2006-12-01 Acquisition of a vessel http://www.
newsweb.no
BASF SE 2007-02-22 Dividend increase, stock repurchase DGAP
BASF SE 2007-02-27 Conversion SE DGAP
BASF SE 2007-03-14 Director’s dealing DGAP
conwert Immobilien Invest SE 2007-02-27 Conversion SE ETUI
Odfjell SE 2007-03-01 Increase shares in a subsidiary http://www.
newsweb.no
Odfjell SE 2007-03-13 Repurchase of bonds http://www.
newsweb.no
Odfjell SE 2007-03-14 Conversion SE http://www.
newsweb.no
Odfjell SE 2007-03-16 Increase shares in a subsidiary http://www.
newsweb.no
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Company Announcement Date Other announcements Source
Odfjell SE 2007-03-20 Insider trading http://www.
newsweb.no
Odfjell SE 2007-03-29 Invitation to general meeting / annual report
(2006)
http://www.
newsweb.no
Odfjell SE 2007-03-30 Sale of ships http://www.
newsweb.no
Porsche Automobil Holding SE 2007-03-24 Decision to increase shares in VW cleared /
obligatory offer to VW shareholders, formation
of SE
DGAP
Porsche Automobil Holding SE 2007-03-26 Exercise of options on VW DGAP
Porsche Automobil Holding SE 2007-03-28 Obligatory offer to VW shareholders DGAP
eurofins scientific SE 2007-03-28 Invitation to the general meeting, conversion SE Le Bulletin officiel
des annonces civiles et
commerciales
Wiener Privatbank SE 2007-04-24 Conversion to SE, announcement of financial
numbers, extension of the board
EuroAdhoc
Wacker Neuson SE 2007-07-19 Building of a new factory in USA elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Wacker Neuson SE 2007-08-14 Formation of SE by merger with Neuson
Kramer Baumaschinen AG
elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Wacker Neuson SE 2007-08-15 Release of consolidated annual financial state-
ment (2006)
elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Wacker Neuson SE 2007-08-16 Release of interim report (2007) elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
I.M. Skaugen SE 2007-09-17 Formation SE by merger, formation of a joint
venture
http://www.
newsweb.no
I.M. Skaugen SE 2007-09-27 Publication of merger plan http://www.
newsweb.no
I.M. Skaugen SE 2007-10-09 Third quarter results http://www.
newsweb.no
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Company Announcement Date Other announcements Source
Klöckner & Co. SE 2007-09-20 Conversion SE EuroAdhoc
Klöckner & Co. SE 2007-09-21 Acquisition of US steal division EuroAdhoc
Klöckner & Co. SE 2007-10-08 Announcement of financial statement numbers EuroAdhoc
Interseroh SE 2007-09-26 Conversion to SE EuroAdhoc
Catalis SE 2007-09-07 Conversion of (hybrid) debt in equity
Catalis SE 2007-10-03 Conversion SE, introduction of holding struc-
ture
DGAP
Catalis SE 2007-10-15 Launch of the product ‘Rail Simulator’ DGAP
Songa Offshore SE 2008-02-29 Conversion SE http://www.
newsweb.no
SGL Carbon SE 2008-03-12 Conversion SE, release of financial statement Company homepage
SGL Carbon SE 2008-03-25 Director’s dealing DGAP
GfK SE 2008-03-31 Conversion SE, release of financial statement Company homepage
IMW Immobilien SE 2008-04-11 Formation SE, merger with Straet Vastgoed
N.V., invitation to annual meeting
elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
IMW Immobilien SE 2008-04-08 Release of financial statement Handelsregister
DVB Bank SE 2008-04-10 Stock split, equity issue via authorised capital
(genehmigtes Kapital), merger with DVB Bank
N.V. (subsidary) and concurrent formation of
SE
DGAP
DVB Bank SE 2008-04-10 Director’s dealing DGAP
DVB Bank SE 2008-04-15 Subsidiary involved in M & A deal DGAP
DVB Bank SE 2008-04-23 Director’s dealing DGAP
DVB Bank SE 2008-04-24 Director’s dealing DGAP
DVB Bank SE 2008-04-29 Director’s dealing DGAP
betbull SE 2008-04-01 Release of financial statement DGAP
betbull SE 2008-04-23 Conversion SE, Notice of annual general meet-
ing
Notice of annual gen-
eral meeting
Q-Cells SE 2008-05-14 Release of quarterly financial statement, forma-
tion SE by merger
elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
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Company Announcement Date Other announcements Source
Q-Cells SE 2008-05-16 Invitation to annual general meeting elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Q-Cells SE 2008-05-23 Insider trading elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Solon SE 2008-04-23 Issuance of convertible bonds elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Solon SE 2008-05-14 Release of interim report elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Solon SE 2008-05-15 Invitation to general meeting, formation SE elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Solon SE 2008-05-23 New resolution added to the agenda by minority
shareholders
elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Solon SE 2008-05-26 Issuance of employee stock options elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Dexia S.A. 2008-06-23 Award of new contracts in Spain Company homepage
Dexia S.A. 2008-07-03 Conversion SE Company homepage
Fotex Holding SE 2008-07-03 Invitation to GM, Conversion SE http://www.bse.hu
MAN SE 2008-07-05 Conversion SE Reuters
SCA Hygiene Products AG 2008-11-18 Periodic release of information, formation SE elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Colexon Energy AG 2008-11-27 Merger with Renewagy A/S, formation SE , re-
lease of financial statement info
DGAP
Colexon Energy AG 2008-12-01 Director’s dealing DGAP
Navigator Equity Solutions SE 2008-12-17 Conversion SE elektronischer Bunde-
sanzeiger
Sword Group 2008-12-29 Conversion SE http://www.
boursier.com
Unibail-Rodamco SE 2008-12-31 Conversion SE ETUI
Nordex SE 2008-04-06 Convserion SE EANS news77
Company Announcement Date Other announcements Source
Tipp 24 SE 2009-05-05 Convserion SE, Invitation to General Meeting Handelsregister
James Hardie Industries SE 2009-06-23 Conversion SE Conference call
Cloppenburg Automobil SE 2009-06-25 Conversion SE ETUI
Bilfinger Berger SE 2009-09-08 Conversion SE DGAP
net SE 2010-02-22 Conversion SE ETUI
Aixtron AG 2010-03-10 Conversion SE DGAP
Jaxx SE 2010-04-23 Conversion SE DGAP
Impreglon SE 2010-05-18 Conversion SE, Invitation GM Handelsregister
REpower Systems AG 2010-09-03 Conversion SE Handelsregister
Puma AG 2010-10-18 Conversion SE EANS AdHoc
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Chapter 4
Persistent Optimism or Pessimism in
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts:
Can an Individual Bias Correction
Improve the Consensus Forecast?
Butler and Lang (1991) show that some analysts’ earnings forecasts are persistently optimistic
or pessimistic relative to consensus forecasts. The reasons for these biases are the subject of a
large literature. Francis and Philbrick (1993), Das et al. (1998) and Lim (2001), among many
others, argue that analysts are optimistic to curry favor with management and obtain priviledged
access to private information. Dugar and Nathan (1995), wei Lin and McNichols (1998) and
Dechow et al. (2000), among others, find evidence that analysts want to win investment banking
business and therefore issue optimistic forecasts for these potential customers. Jackson (2005)
puts forward the hypothesis that analysts are optimistic because they want to win trading busi-
ness from investors who do not do their own research. There are only few papers that explain
why some analysts are pessimistic. One of them is Matsumoto (2002) who argues that firms
appreciate pessimistic analysts as their forecasts are easier to beat. A mitigating effect to these
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biases are analysts’ career concerns that are studied by Hong and Kubik (2003), Cowen et al.
(2006), and Fang and Yasuda (2009).
A consequence of these different incentives and tradeoffs is that the analyst’s loss function,
which maps her forecast errors into losses, is not symmetric. Rodriguez (2007) explicitly shows
how an asymmetric loss function arises from the tradeoff between different analyst incentives.
Clatworthy et al. (2005) derive predictions from a model with asymmetric loss functions, and
Markov and Tan (2006) and Rodriguez (2007) show that the null hypothesis of forecast effi-
ciency cannot be rejected in a model that allows for asymmetric loss functions. A different
strand of the literature argues that analysts suffer from cognitive biases, so that biases cannot be
explained by rational tradeoffs (see Bondt and Thaler (1990) or Friesen and Weller (2006)).
In this paper, we put forward a model that is based on the assumption that different analysts
have different biases and that these biases persist over time. We do not model or conjecture
where these biases come from. Instead, we estimate them and use them to improve the consen-
sus forecast. Our model assumes that analysts combine public and private information to infer
a perceived earnings distribution. Analysts differ in their private information, so every analyst
has a different perceived earnings distribution. To model biases, we assume that every analyst
has a fixed target quantile of the perceived earnings distribution that she wants to forecast. If
her target quantile is the median, she will forecast the median of this distribution and exhibits
no forecast bias. If she is optimistic, however, her target quantile will be higher than the me-
dian. Likewise if she is pessimistic, the target quantile will be below the median. We allow
these target quantiles to vary across the firms an analyst provides earnings forecasts for, but we
assume that target quantiles are constant for each analyst-firm pair.
We estimate our model separately for each of 939 firms from the IBES universe with suf-
ficient history. The model produces estimates of individual analyst-firm target quantiles and
we first analyze the determinants of analyst precision. We find that forecasts are more precise
for analysts with more experience who work for larger brokers and follow more companies but
fewer industries. Our further analysis shows, however, that only the size of the broker seems
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to cause higher precision. In contrast, analysts who have more experience and follow more
companies and fewer industries are matched to firms that are generally associated with higher
precision. Our evidence therefore suggests that analysts, as they become more experienced, fol-
low firms with better informational environment. At the same time, they follow more firms and
fewer industries. We classify 73% of the analysts as optimists and 27% as pessimists. When
we distinguish between these two subsamples and control for the matching between analysts
and firms, the size of the broker increases precision only for the subsample of optimists but is
insignificant for pessimists.
In the second step, we use our estimates of analyst target quantiles to generate an aggregate
out-of-sample earnings forecast. Our model forecast is better than the consensus forecast: On
average across all firms and years, it reduces the average percentage forecast error by 72% and
the root mean-squared error (RMSE) by 8%. We also consider a simple correction of the con-
sensus forecast where we deduct the historical forecast bias from the out-of-sample forecast, but
this correction does not improve the consensus forecast. We then analyze individual years from
2001 to 2009 and find that our out-of-sample earnings forecast beats the consensus forecasts
in years where uncertainty as measured by the dispersion in analyst forecasts is high. Uncer-
tainty was highest in 2009, and our out-of-sample forecast led to a 15% reduction in the RMSE
relative to the consensus forecast in this year. In predictive regressions of realized earnings on
different forecasts, we find that our out-of-sample forecast explains 54.6% of the variation in re-
alized earnings compared to 48.3% for the consensus forecast. In a regression on both forecasts,
the consensus forecast becomes insignificant whereas our model forecast remains significant at
the 10% level. We therefore conclude that our model significantly improves on the consensus
forecast, especially in years with high uncertainty.
Our model also produces estimates for two variances. The first variance, which we call an-
alyst disagreement, is the variation in the location of the perceived earnings distributions across
analysts. If this variance is high, analysts disagree about the location of the earnings distribution
and therefore issue different forecasts. The second variance is the variance of the earnings dis-
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tribution that cannot be forecasted by anybody in our model economy. If this variance is high,
analysts also issue different forecasts, but not because they disagree about the earnings distribu-
tion. Instead, analyst forecasts differ, because the variance of the earnings distribution is high
and different analysts forecast different quantiles of this earnings distribution. We find that our
estimate of analyst disagreement is positively correlated with analyst forecast dispersion, with
the bid-ask spread, and with Amihud’s (Amihud, 2002) measure of illiquidity.
We also consider a simplified version of our model that can be easily implemented with stan-
dard statistical software packages. For this simplification, we replace the term in the forecast
equation that depends on the analyst’s target quantile by an analyst fixed effect. We conse-
quently call this model the Analyst Fixed Effects model, or AFE model. We show that this
model performs equally well as the full model in most of our analyses. The AFE model there-
fore constitutes a convenient way to implement our approach in practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the full
model and the simplified AFE model. Section 4.2 describes the construction of the dataset,
and Section 4.3 investigates the determinants of analyst target quantiles. We compare our out-
of-sample forecasts with the consensus forecast in Section 4.4 and relate our two measures of
uncertainty to other measures of uncertainty in Section 4.5.
4.1 A structural model of analyst forecasts
In this section, we introduce a structural model of analysts’ forecasts that is based on the as-
sumption that different analysts have different forecast biases. In addition, we propose a simpler
version of the model that can be easily implemented with standard statistical software packages.
4.1.1 Full structural model
We consider a single firm and denote its earnings in year t by Xt . Earnings have two components,
a predictable component µt which is known among analysts, and an unpredictable component
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νt that is unknown to everybody, including analysts, in the economy :
Xt = µt +νt . (4.1)
Here, νt is a normal random variable with zero mean and variance σ2ν . We can think of the
predictable component µt as consisting of two parts: µt = mt +ηt . The first part mt can be
mechanically forecasted from the past time series of earnings or from other data that is readily
available, such as macro-economic data. For this part, analysts are not needed. The second
part ηt is a random term that cannot be forecasted by non-analysts but that is known (at least
in the aggregate) across analysts. The second part, ηt , is the reason why analysts add value.
We do not distinguish between mt and ηt when we estimate the model. Instead, we assume
that µ1, µ2, ... are parameters of the model, just like σ2ν . The advantage of this semi-parametric
approach is that we need not model the earnings process and that our estimates are not affected
by any misspecification in the assumed earnings process. The disadvantage of this approach is
that the number of parameters that need to be estimated is rather large.
We assume that there are N analysts i = 1, 2, ..., N who follow the firm and issue forecasts.
We do not require that every analyst issues a forecast in each period. The earnings forecast of
analyst i at the beginning of the period t is Fi,t . Each analyst observes the predictable earnings
component µt only with a disturbance εi,t and therefore believes that earnings Xt will be drawn
from a normal distribution with mean µbi,t = µt + εi,t and variance σ
2
ν . We assume that the
disturbance εi,t is normally distributed across analysts with zero mean and variance σ2ε . The
variance σ2ε can be interpreted as disagreement across analysts regarding the location of the
earnings distribution.1
If all analysts wanted to maximize the precision of their forecasts, they would forecast
F˜i,t = µbi,t = µt + εi,t . Then the mean of the forecasts, i.e. the consensus forecast, would
1An alternative approach is to assume that each analyst observes a public and a private signal and calculates the
posterior distribution via Bayesian updating. The result would be a much more complicated model where not only
the expressions for the posterior mean and variance are more complicated, but also the posterior variance differs
between analysts.
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be the best estimator for µt and therefore for the earnings Xt . We assume, however, that at
least some analysts have incentives or traits so that their forecasts are pessimistic or optimistic.
More precisely, analyst i always forecasts the qi-quantile of her perceived earnings distribution.2
Therefore, she will issue the forecast Fi,t such that
Φ
(
Fi,t−µt− εi,t
σν
)
= qi, (4.2)
where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function. Rearranging yields
Fi,t =Φ−1(qi)σν +µt + εi,t . (4.3)
In the remainder of this paper, we callΦ−1(qi) the target quantile and qi the target probability of
analyst i. An analyst who is neither pessimistic nor optimistic but only interested in maximizing
her forecast precision has qi = 0.5. Then Φ−1(qi) = 0 and Fi,t = F˜i,t . If qi < 0.5, the analyst
is pessimistic, and if qi > 0.5, the analyst is optimistic. The target probabilities q1, q2, ..., qN
are parameters in our model. We do not model the reason why analysts issue biased forecasts.
Instead, we estimate these biases and use them to improve forecasting.
We estimate this model for each individual firm by maximum likelihood, where the pa-
rameters are the analysts’ target probabilities q1, q2, ..., qN , the predictable earnings component
µ1, µ2, ..., µT , the economy-wide uncertainty σ2ν and analyst disagreement σ2ε . Estimation can-
not be done in a straightforward way with standard statistical packages. Instead, we write down
the likelihood function, concentrate out a number of parameters and solve the resulting model
with numerical maximization routines. A technical document with the derivation of the con-
centrated likelihood function can be obtained from the authors upon request.
2We work with the simplest possible stability assumption that the target quantile of each analyst is constant
over time. Future extensions of our model might include time varying target quantiles that change over time, e.g.,
with an autoregressive pattern. Due to the limited number of observations per analyst, however, it will probably not
be possible to estimate an autoregressive parameter separately for each analyst. It is possible, however, to estimate
this parameter if it is the same for all analysts.
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4.1.2 A simplified version of the model (AFE model)
We can simplify Equation (4.3) by defining an analyst fixed effect ai =Φ−1(qi)σν . The result-
ing model is given by
Fi,t = ai+µt + εi,t , (4.4)
µt = Xt−νt , νt ∼ N
(
0,σ2ν
)
. (4.5)
This model can be implemented in a straightforward way with standard statistical packages like
SAS or Stata. We call this model the analyst-fixed-effects model, or AFE model in order to
stress the difference to the full model from Equations (4.3) and (4.1).3 The estimates of the
two models will differ in general. In the full model, the variance σ2ν is estimated to minimize
the time-series variance in Equation (4.1) and the cross-sectional variance in Equation (4.3)
(via the interaction with Φ−1(qi)). In contrast, the same variance estimator only minimizes the
time-series variance in the AFE model. In the empirical part of this paper, we always compare
both models to establish whether this difference is important.
4.1.3 Out-of-sample forecasts
To generate out-of-sample forecasts for year T + 1, we estimate both models with data up to
and including year T and plug these estimates into Equations (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. Re-
arranging then yields for t = T +1:
µˆ f ulli,T+1 = Fi,T+1−Φ−1(qˆi)σˆν , (4.6)
µˆa f ei,T+1 = Fi,T+1− âi. (4.7)
Here, qˆi is the estimated target probability for analyst i, σˆ2ν is the estimated variance of the
economy wide uncertainty νT+1, Fi,T+1 is analyst i’s forecast at the beginning of period T +1,
3Formally, equation (4.4) has not only an analyst fixed effect (ai) but also a time random effect (µt ), so that the
model could also be referred to as “mixed effects model”.
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and âi is the estimated fixed effect for analyst i. We effectively remove the bias from analyst i’s
forecast Fi,T+1 and back out an estimate of analyst i’s belief about the location of the earnings
distribution, µˆi,T+1. We then average these implicit beliefs across all analysts in order to arrive
at our model forecast
XˆT+1 =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
µˆi,T+1. (4.8)
For the full model, the model forecast Xˆ f ullT+1 reduces to the conventional consensus forecast if
qˆi = 0.5 for all analysts in our sample. For the APE model, the model forecast Xˆ
a f e
T+1 is identical
to the consensus forecast if âi = 0 for all analysts. Hence, we obtain the consensus forecast if
all analyst forecast biases are zero in our sample.
4.2 Data set
From IBES, we obtain all one-year ahead earnings per share forecasts that are issued during the
first month after the last earnings announcement. If an analyst issues more than one earnings
forecast for a given firm during this month, we only keep the latest of these forecasts and delete
all the others. We only consider U.S. companies that report their earnings in US dollars and
forecasts that are in US dollars. We exclude ADRs and other types of instruments followed in
IBES that are not classified as “securities”. Earnings per share (both realizations and forecasts)
are typically on a fully diluted basis. If they are not, we adjust them accordingly.4
One reason why analysts might issue biased forecasts are the incentives the analyst’s broker
has, e.g., because the broker wants to secure underwriting business or wants to keep up its
reputation. The analyst’s bias therefore might change when she changes brokers. Therefore,
4Payne and Thomas (2003) point out that IBES data contain rounding errors, because after adjusting them
for stock splits forecasts and announcements are rounded to four digits. We choose not to use unadjusted data
and adjust for stock splits ourselves, because none of the methods discussed in the literature is without its own
problems. Moreover, these rounding errors are unlikely to bias our results. Our model is based on the assump-
tion that different analysts have different biases. In extreme cases, rounding can remove existing biases, so that
our model loses its competitive advantage over existing models that implicitly assume unbiased forecasts. So if
anything, rounding will work against our model. Ljungqvist et al. (2009) document that the IBES database was
historically unreliable for stock recommendations. As we work with newer data (downloads in 2009 and later) and
with earnings forecasts we are confident that this caveat does not apply to our analysis.
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Table 4.1: Description of our sample
Panel A displays descriptive statistics of key variables in our dataset. Forecasted EPS are one-year ahead forecasts for earnings per share, Earnings per share are
realized earnings per share, Std. dev. of forecasts is the standard deviation of all forecasted EPS per firm-year, Industries per analyst are the number of the 49
Fama-French industries the analyst follows, Analyst experience is the number of years between the analyst’s first appearance in the database and her forecast), and
Broker size is the number of analysts who work for the considered analyst’s employer. Std. dev. of forecasts, Companies per analyst, Industries per analyst, and
Broker size are based on the complete IBES universe. Panel B shows a breakdown of our sample of 939 firms into the 10 Fama-French industries.
Panel A: Distribution of key variables
Variable
Measurement
Obs Mean Std. dev.
Quantile
level Min. 25% 50% 75% Max.
Forecasted EPS analyst-firm-year 120,827 1.9 4.2 -27.2 0.6 1.3 2.2 217.5
Earnings per share (EPS) firm-year 14,603 1.5 5.4 -398.2 0.5 1.1 2.0 189.0
Consensus forcast (EPS) firm-year 14,603 1.8 4.5 -22.8 0.6 1.2 2.1 204.6
Std. dev. of forecasts firm-year 14,603 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 25.6
Total assets (TA, in million $) firm-year 14,596 18,692 80,961 26 1,122 3,436 11,494 2,187,631
Intangible assets scaled by TA firm-year 12,479 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9
R&D scaled by TA firm-year 5,334 11.5 71.4 0.0 0.1 1.5 6.7 2,430.0
Companies per analyst analyst-year 109,182 17.8 13.1 1.0 11.0 15.0 21.0 332.0
Industries per analyst analyst-year 109,182 3.5 3.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 28.0
Analyst experience analyst-year 109,182 7.6 4.9 1.0 4.0 6.0 10.0 27.0
Broker size analyst-year 109,182 65.4 58.7 1.0 22.0 50.0 88.0 326.0
87
Table 4.1: Continued
Panel B: Industry classification
Industry (Fama-French-10-industry) Obs
Consumer NonDurable 62
Consumer Durables 23
Manufacturing 143
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 60
Business Equipment 170
Telephone and Television Transmission 25
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) 98
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 53
Utilities 62
Other 243
we estimate the model for analyst-broker pairs, even though we talk about “analysts” for
the sake of readability. When an analyst changes her broker, we treat her as a different analyst.
Moreover, we estimate the model separately for each firm. Hence, the analyst fixed effect ai in
Equation (4.4) is in fact an analyst-broker-firm fixed effect, and the same holds for the analyst’s
target probability qi in Equation (4.3).
As our model contains a large number of parameters, we can estimate it only for firms with
good analyst coverage and a sufficiently long time series of earnings announcements. We there-
fore require at last 10 years of uninterrupted history, each year with an earnings announcement
and at least two analyst forecasts. The resulting sample has 939 firms. On average per firm, we
have 129 forecasts that are issued by 63 analysts. In our analysis, we also consider the following
firm characteristics from CompuStat North America: research and development expenses, total
assets, intangible assets, and the SIC code. We use prices from CRSP in order to scale forecast
errors. We match IBES data with CompuStat and CRSP data with the WRDS linking table.
Table 4.1, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for some key variables in our sample. Aver-
age earnings per share (EPS) is $1.5 while average forecasted EPS is $1.9, and the consensus
forecast is $1.8. Firm size ranges from $26m to $2,188bn, where the largest firm is Citigroup.
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The median analyst follows 15 companies and three industries according to the Fama-French
49 industry classification. The median broker employs 50 analysts, and analyst experience (i.e.
the number of years between the analyst’s first appearance in the database and the forecast) is
6 years. Panel B of Table 4.1 provides a breakdown of the 939 firms in our dataset into the 10
Fama-French industries. Most firms operate in the Business Equipment and the Manufacturing
industries.
4.3 Analyst optimism and pessimism
Our model assumes that some analysts are optimistic or pessimistic. They issue forecasts that
are consistently above or below the consensus forecast. To test whether this assumption is war-
ranted, we re-estimate our model with the restriction that all analyst target quantiles Φ−1(qi)
equal zero. The explanatory power of this restricted model should be lower compared to the
unrestricted estimation if some analysts are indeed optimistic or pessimistic. We use the likeli-
hood ratio test and reject the hypothesis that the restricted model is as good as the unrestricted
model for 79% of the firms in our sample at the 1% significance level (not shown in the tables).
We therefore consider our estimates of the target probabilities of different analysts and relate
them to analyst characteristics in this section.
Table 4.2, Panel A displays descriptive statistics of the parameter estimates that we obtain
when we estimate the model separately for the 917 firms in our sample for which our algorithm
converges. The last three lines of the table show our estimates for the predictable earnings
component µt , and for the two variances σν and σε , and we will discuss these values in Section
4.5. In this section, we focus on the first three lines that show descriptive statistics for the target
probabilities qi, j for those analysts i that issue at least one, three, or, respectively, five forecasts
for firm j. For the 4,432 analyst-firm years where the analyst issues at least five forecasts
over time for the considered firm, the mean target probability is 56.9% and the median target
probability is 58.4. Therefore, analysts are considerably optimistic on average. However, we
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Table 4.2: Description of parameter estimates
This table displays descriptive statistics of the parameter estimates from our model across the 917 firms in our sample for which our numerical routine converges.
The parameters are the target probability qi, j of analyst i for firm j, the predictable earnings component µt , analyst disagreement σε , and economy-wide uncertainty
σν . The distribution of target probabilities qi, j is shown for three different filters depending on the number of forecasts (one, three, and five) that she issues for firm
j.
Panel A: Determinants of analysts’ precision for the full model
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Quantile
Min 25% 50% 75% Max.
Target probability qi, j in (%)
all analysts-firms 57,934 57.7 17.1 0.0 48.7 59.2 68.3 100.0
analyst-firms with 3+ forecasts 14,918 57.4 15.3 0.0 49.5 59.1 66.9 100.0
analyst-firms with 5+ forecasts 4,432 56.9 14.5 0.0 49.0 58.4 66.1 100.0
Predictable earnings component µt 14,305 1.5 3.8 -25.2 0.5 1.1 2.0 178.3
Disagreement σε 917 0.113 0.297 0.005 0.027 0.049 0.100 5.303
Uncertainty σν 917 4.723 65.091 0.001 0.167 0.332 0.670 1,640.987
Panel B: Determinants of analysts’ precision for the AFE model
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Quantile
Min 25% 50% 75% Max.
Target probability qi, j (in %)
all analysts-firms 58,923 57.5 16.7 0.0 48.6 59.2 67.7 100.0
analyst-firms with 3+ forecasts 14,918 57.2 15.0 0.0 49.5 59.2 66.4 100.0
analyst-firms with 5+ forecasts 4,432 56.8 14.2 0.0 49.1 58.6 65.7 100.0
Predictable earnings component µt 14,603 1.5 3.8 -25.7 0.5 1.1 2.0 182.9
Disagreement σε 939 0.175 0.483 0.004 0.043 0.082 0.161 10.047
Uncertainty σν 939 0.900 3.875 0.000 0.167 0.336 0.684 101.965
90
Figure 4.1: Histogram of target probability
This figure shows the histogram of the target probabilities qi, j of analyst i for firm j for those 4,432 analyst-firm
pairs where the analyst issues at least five forecasts.
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find a negative target quantile Φ−1(qi, j) for 27,2% of all analysts (not shown in the table),
i.e., these analysts are pessimists. Table 4.2, Panel B shows that our result for the target quan-
tiles from the APE model are very similar to the results obtained with the full model. Figure
4.1 shows the complete histogram of the target probabilities for those 4,432 analyst-firm pairs
where the analyst issues at least five forecasts. The figure shows that the distribution of target
probabilities is skewed slightly to the left. We can reject the hypothesis that the target quantile
equals zero at the 5% significance level for 82% of all analyst-firm pairs with the LM test and
for 18% with the Wald test (not shown in the tables). These tests corroborate our assumption
that some analysts are consistently optimistic or pessimistic.
Figure 4.2 shows for an example firm the earnings time series (solid line) and the forecasts
of all analysts who issue at least three forecasts for this firm. The forecasts of the pessimists (i.e.
the forecasts of those analysts for whom we estimate the target probability to be below 50%)
are shown as circles while the forecasts of the optimists are shown as plusses. The figure shows
that our model can distinguish between optimistic and pessimistic forecasts for this company.
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Figure 4.2: Optimistic and pessimistic forecasts for Hess corporation
This figure shows a visualization of our data for an example firm. The realized earnings over time are displayed
as solid line. The circles and plusses indicate the forecasts of all analysts who issue at least three forecasts for this
firm over time. The forecasts of the pessimists (whose estimated target probability q̂i is below 50%) are shown
as circles while the forecasts of the optimists (whose estimated target probability q̂i is above 50%) are shown as
plusses.
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The forecasts of optimistic analysts are indeed above those of pessimistic analysts.
We now turn to analyst precision which we measure by the natural logarithm of the absolute
value of the target quantile, ln
∣∣Φ−1 (qi, j)∣∣. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4.3, Panel A
regress this measure of precision on four characteristics of the analyst: The number of compa-
nies she follows; the number of the 49 Fama-French industries she follows; her age, i.e. the
number of years between her first appearance in the IBES database and her forecast; and her
broker’s size, which we measure by the number of analysts who are associated with the same
broker and who issue a forecast for any firm in the IBES universe in the same year. Depen-
dent variables are averaged across all years in which an analyst makes a forecast for a given
firm. Also, an analyst can enter this regression several times, because we estimate qi, j for each
firm j separately. An analyst who follows three firms enters our regressions three times and we
therefore cluster the standard errors at the analyst level.
Specification (1) shows that all four explanatory variables are highly significant. Analysts
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Table 4.3: Determinants of analyst precision and analyst biases
This table shows regressions of analyst precision ln
∣∣Φ−1 (qi, j)∣∣. The independent variables are the natural log-
arithm of the number of companies, the natural logarithm of the number of industries the analyst follows, the
natural logarithm of her experience (i.e. the number of years between her first appearance in the database and her
forecast), and the natural logarithm of her broker size that is measured by the number of analysts associated to
her employer in the same year. We construct these independent variables with respect to all companies that are
in I/B/E/S and in CRSP and average them across all years in which the analyst makes a forecast for the consid-
ered firm. Specifications (1) and (2) are for the full sample. Specifications (3) and (4) consider the subsample of
optimists where Φ−1(qi, j) > 0, and specifications (5) and (6) the subsample of pessimists where Φ−1(qi, j) < 0.
We consider regressions with and without firm fixed effects and report the unadjusted R2. Panel A displays the
results for the full model and Panel B for the AFE model. All regressions are at the analyst-firm level, so that an
analyst can enter the regression more than once. We therefore cluster standard errors at the analyst level (shown in
parentheses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A: Determinants of analysts’ precision for the full model
Dependent variable:
ln
∣∣Φ−1 (qi, j)∣∣
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All All Optimists Optimists Pessimists Pessimists
Intercept -1.296∗∗∗ -0.826∗∗∗ -1.172∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗ -1.620∗∗∗ -1.282∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.076) (0.041) (0.081) (0.075) (0.205)
ln(companies) 0.065∗∗∗ -0.015∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.015 0.072∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018)
ln(experience) -0.055∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.068∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.014 -0.008
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020) (0.016)
ln(industries) -0.031∗∗∗ -0.003 0.016 0.003 -0.181∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019)
ln(broker_size) -0.031∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010)
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.21% 47.38% 0.31% 54.70% 0.69% 48.81%
N 57,667 57,667 41,515 41,515 16,152 16,152
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Table 4.3: Continued
Panel B: Determinants of analysts’ precision for the AFE model
Dependent variable:
ln |ai/σν |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All All Optimists Optimists Pessimists Pessimists
Intercept -1.190∗∗∗ -0.858∗∗∗ -1.062∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -1.539∗∗∗ -1.548∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.076) (0.034) (0.072) (0.080) (0.285)
ln(companies) 0.026∗∗ -0.022∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.010 0.020 -0.057∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.025)
ln(experience) -0.025∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.045∗∗∗ 0.000 0.030 0.012
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.017)
ln(industries) -0.033∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021)
ln(broker_size) -0.031∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010)
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.12% 34.16% 0.23% 39.11% 0.35% 44.63%
N 58,567 58,567 42,414 42,414 16,153 16,153
are more precise if they follow less firms, more industries, and if they are older and work for
a larger broker. When we control for firm fixed effects in Specification (2), only the size of
the broker remains highly significant. Broker size is likely to proxy for reputation, and Fang
and Yasuda (2009) also find in fixed effects regressions that accuracy is positively related to
reputation. Interestingly, analyst experience that was highly significant in Specification (1)
is insignificant in Specification (2). This implies that more experienced analysts are not more
precise but that they follow firms where analysts are more precise on average. A potential reason
is that young analysts start with small firms that are more difficult to forecast and later switch
to bigger firms with a better information environment. Likewise, analysts who concentrate
on more firms might follow smaller firms that are more difficult to forecast accurately. Also,
analysts who follow more industries might concentrate on firms where it is easier to make
precise forecasts. The only effect that is not due to such a selection effect is the size of the
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broker. This is intuitive, because broker size proxies for analyst expertise and broker reputation.
We next analyze whether these effects are the same for optimistic and pessimistic analysts.
In Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 4.3, we run the same regressions for the subsample of
optimistic analysts, i.e. where Φ−1(qi) > 0. In Specifications (5) and (6) we consider the
subsample of pessimists where Φ−1(qi)< 0. It turns out that the effects are not the same in the
two subsamples. Once we control for selection effects in Specifications (4) and (6), broker size
significantly reduces only optimism but not pessimism. On the other hand, pessimism is lower
when the analyst follows fewer firms, but the number of firms is unrelated to optimism.
Table 3, Panel B shows similar results for the AFE model that estimates ai = Φ−1(qi)σν
instead of qi in the full model. We therefore define precision by ln |ai/σν |, which becomes the
dependent variable in the regressions in Table 3, Panel B. A comparison between the two panels
yields that the two sets of results are very similar. Hence, it is justifiable to use the simpler AFE
model to estimate analyst target quantiles.
Altogether, these results are in line with the literature on analyst precision and analyst biases.
They show that our estimates of the target probabilities qi make sense. Beyond these target
probabilities, our model also generates forecasts for future earnings and estimates of analyst
disagreement and economy-wide uncertainty. These are the topics we now turn to.
4.4 Forecasting earnings
To generate and evaluate forecasts out-of-sample, we adjust our estimation procedure. We start
with forecasts for the year 2001 and therefore consider only firms with at least ten years history
ending in 2000. In each of the prior years, firms must have issued an earnings announcement
and must have received at least two analyst forecasts. We then repeat this process for 2002,
2003, ..., 2008. In this way, we construct nine different samples (one for each year from 2000 to
2008) with between 277 and 399 firms each. Each firm in the nine samples has an out of sample
forecast for the next year (2001 to 2009) as described in Equation (4.8). We compare the
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forecasts from our full model, Xˆ f ullT+1, and the AFE model, Xˆ
a f e
T+1, to two benchmarks: the mean
of all analyst forecasts for year T + 1 (the consensus forecast), and the corrected consensus
forecast, where we estimate the bias of the consensus forecast within sample (i.e. up to year
T ) and then deduct this bias from the out-of-sample consensus forecast. If all analysts have the
same level of optimism on average and consistently over time, the corrected consensus forecast
removes the optimism from the forecast.
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for the forecast errors of the four models for each of
the nine years from 2001 to 2009 and for the pooled sample. The forecast error is defined
as the difference between the forecast from the beginning of year T and the realized earnings
from the end of year T scaled by the stock price from year T − 1.5 The table shows that
across all years the mean forecast error of our full model is 0.0029 compared to 0.0101 for the
consensus forecast and 0.0045 for the corrected consensus forecast, so according to this measure
our model estimate improves forecast accuracy. The RMSE yields a similar result. It is 0.0757
for our model compared to 0.0820 for both the corrected and uncorrected consensus forecast.
When we consider the median forecast error or the mean absolute forecast error (MAFE), the
consensus forecast is slightly better than our model forecasts whereas the corrected consensus
forecast comes third.
Table 4.4: Out-of-sample earnings forecasts
This table shows descriptive statistics of the forecast accuracy of four different models: (1) the consen-
sus forecast, (2) the corrected consensus forecast where the bias of the consensus forecast is estimated
in sample and deducted from the consensus forecast out-of-sample, (3) the out-of-sample forecast from
our full model (see Equation 4.6), and (4) the out-of-sample forecast from the AFE model (see Equa-
tion 4.7). The table shows the mean and the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles of the forecast error, which
is the difference between the realized earnings and the forecast scaled by the price from the last fiscal
year end. It also shows the mean absolute forecast error and the root mean-squared error, RMSE. We
repeat this analysis for each year from 2001 to 2009 and also show the results for the pooled sample
of all years. In the leftmost column, the table also shows the number of firms in the respective sample
and the analyst forecast dispersion (the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts) in the respective year,
where the standard deviation is calculated for each firm and the average is taken across firms.
5Here as everywhere in the paper “year” refers to “fiscal year” which may or may not coincide with the calendar
year.
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Year
Model
Forecast error
MAFE RMSE(# firms) Quantiles
Mean
{forecast std.} 25% 50% 75%
2001-2009 Consensus -0.0050 0.0001 0.0091 0.0101 0.0237 0.0820
(2,929) Corr. Cons. -0.0113 -0.0017 0.0067 0.0045 0.0257 0.0820
{0.192} Full model -0.0092 -0.0013 0.0058 0.0029 0.0242 0.0757
AFE model -0.0090 -0.0013 0.0057 0.0030 0.0240 0.0747
2001 Consensus -0.0022 0.0012 0.0153 0.0081 0.0226 0.0439
(304) Corr. Cons. -0.0113 -0.0010 0.0092 -0.0006 0.0248 0.0444
{0.183} Full model -0.0064 -0.0002 0.0096 0.0004 0.0215 0.0404
AFE model -0.0063 -0.0001 0.0094 0.0006 0.0213 0.0403
2002 Consensus -0.0004 0.0049 0.0231 0.0191 0.0250 0.0573
(277) Corr. Cons. -0.0052 0.0010 0.0169 0.0121 0.0244 0.0531
{0.126} Full model -0.0028 0.0023 0.0178 0.0114 0.0231 0.0533
AFE model -0.0030 0.0021 0.0178 0.0115 0.0229 0.0529
2003 Consensus -0.0040 0.0003 0.0079 0.0044 0.0161 0.0382
(287) Corr. Cons. -0.0132 -0.0027 0.0046 -0.0033 0.0190 0.0393
{0.154} Full model -0.0102 -0.0014 0.0041 -0.0054 0.0195 0.0559
AFE model -0.0099 -0.0018 0.0039 -0.0041 0.0183 0.0410
2004 Consensus -0.0090 -0.0013 0.0045 -0.0016 0.0197 0.0549
(316) Corr. Cons. -0.0170 -0.0051 0.0021 -0.0082 0.0229 0.0594
{0.153} Full model -0.0163 -0.0045 0.0008 -0.0123 0.0229 0.0665
AFE model -0.0164 -0.0049 0.0009 -0.0126 0.0231 0.0684
2005 Consensus -0.0119 -0.0016 0.0029 -0.0038 0.0182 0.0439
(319) Corr. Cons. -0.0212 -0.0051 0.0012 -0.0097 0.0204 0.0444
{0.161} Full model -0.0180 -0.0040 0.0011 -0.0093 0.0208 0.0470
AFE model -0.0173 -0.0040 0.0012 -0.0091 0.0204 0.0463
2006 Consensus -0.0080 -0.0017 0.0033 -0.0011 0.0158 0.0332
(348) Corr. Cons. -0.0141 -0.0037 0.0023 -0.0077 0.0182 0.0410
{0.144} Full model -0.0135 -0.0034 0.0020 -0.0072 0.0169 0.0329
AFE model -0.0137 -0.0034 0.0020 -0.0073 0.0169 0.0331
2007 Consensus -0.0064 -0.0009 0.0059 0.0027 0.0155 0.0341
(379) Corr. Cons. -0.0108 -0.0024 0.0041 -0.0011 0.0187 0.0373
{0.219} Full model -0.0103 -0.0028 0.0032 -0.0030 0.0165 0.0339
AFE model -0.0104 -0.0027 0.0032 -0.0029 0.0163 0.0337
2008 Consensus -0.0042 0.0001 0.0088 0.0117 0.0223 0.0630
(399) Corr. Cons. -0.0074 -0.0006 0.0089 0.0091 0.0244 0.0640
{0.194} Full model -0.0066 -0.0010 0.0076 0.0076 0.0232 0.0620
AFE model -0.0066 -0.0010 0.0074 0.0077 0.0230 0.0618
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2009 Consensus -0.0017 0.0059 0.0282 0.0567 0.0627 0.2145
(300) Corr. Cons. -0.0034 0.0047 0.0257 0.0534 0.0614 0.2113
{0.392} Full model -0.0023 0.0042 0.0212 0.0470 0.0573 0.1838
AFE model -0.0023 0.0045 0.0207 0.0469 0.0570 0.1834
When we investigate the mean forecast errors for each year separately, we see that our
model forecasts beat the consensus forecasts in years 2001, 2002, 2008, and 2009 while the
consensus forecast is better than our model forecast for the years 2003 to 2006. In 2007
both models are equally accurate. The table also shows the analyst forecast dispersion Dt =
1
K ∑
K
j=1
1
N−1 ∑
N
i=1
(
Fi, j,t−F ., j,t
)2 in the leftmost column: we first calculate the standard devia-
tion across analysts’ forecasts Fi, j,t for each firm j and then average these estimates across firms.
This measure of uncertainty is often referred to in the literature as “analyst disagreement”. It is
higher in 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009 than in the period from 2002 to 2006. Hence, our model
yields more accurate earnings forecasts in those years where uncertainty is high.
The forecast errors of the AFE model are very similar to the errors of the full model. Al-
together we therefore conclude that the consensus forecast can be considerably improved by
taking into account the individual biases of different analysts. The AFE model is a tractable
model that generates the same improvements as the more sophisticated full model.
Table 4.5 displays regressions of realized EPS on the four different forecasts across all 2,929
firms in the pooled sample. Specifications (1) to (3) show that our model can explain 54.5%
of the variation in EPS, while the consensus forecast can explain only 48.3% and the corrected
consensus forecast 47.0%. In Specifications (4) and (5), the coefficients on the consensus fore-
cast and, respectively, the corrected consensus forecast become insignificant when we also add
our model forecast to the regression. In contrast to the (corrected) consensus forecast, our model
forecast remains significant.
Specifications (6) to (8) investigate the predictive power of the AFE model in a similar way.
The APE forecasts explain 55.0% of the variation in EPS, i.e. slightly more than the full model.
Again the (corrected) consensus forecast becomes insignificant when we also include the AFE
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Table 4.5: Regressions of realized on forecasted earnings
This table displays the results of five regressions of realized EPS on four forecasts: (1) the consensus forecast, (2) the corrected consensus forecast where the bias of
the consensus forecast is estimated in sample and deducted from the consensus forecast out-of-sample, (3) the out-of-sample forecast from our model (see equation
(6)), and (4) the out-of-sample forecast from the AFE model (see equation (7)). The regressions are done in the pooled sample of 2,929 firm-year observations from
2001 to 2009. Huber-White standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The table also
shows the unadjusted R2 and the p-value of the F-test of the hypothesis that the slope of the regression equals one and the intercept equals zero.
Dependent variable:
EPS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept -0.020 -0.010 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
Consensus 1.172∗∗∗ -0.164 -0.529
(0.307) (0.627) (0.639)
Cor. Cons. 1.097∗∗∗ -0.350 -0.782
(0.277) (0.628) (0.604)
Full Model 1.032∗∗∗ 1.161∗ 1.324∗∗
(0.226) (0.611) (0.651)
AFE Model 1.051∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.620) (0.624)
R2adj 48.3% 47.0% 54.5% 54.6% 55.0% 55.8% 56.5% 57.4%
p-value of F-test 0.00% 0.26% 6.56% 5.18%
N 2,929 2,929 2,929 2,929 2,929 2,929 2,929 2,929
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forecast into the regression.
In a good forecast regression, the intercept should be close to zero and the slope coefficient
close to one. In Table 4.5, we use an F-test to test this hypothesis for each of the four forecasts.
We find that this hypothesis is rejected with a p-value smaller than 0.005% for the consensus
forecast and a p-value of 0.26% for the corrected consensus forecast. In contrast, the p-value
is 6.6% for our full model forecast and 5.18% for the AFE forecast, which indicates that our
model (and to a lesser extent the AFE model) produces better, i.e., less biased forecasts.
4.5 Disagreement and uncertainty
Our model produces two estimates of uncertainty. First, the economy-wide uncertainty σν
is the standard deviation of the noise that cannot be forecasted even if all information in the
economy is combined. Second, analyst disagreement σε is the standard deviation of the noise
in each analyst’s perception of the location of the earnings distribution. The larger σε the more
analysts disagree about the location of the earnings distribution. In contrast, σν determines the
dispersion of the distribution as perceived by analysts. Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics
for our estimates across the 917 firms in our sample. Median disagreement (σε ) is 4.9% and
much smaller than median uncertainty (σν ) which is 33.2%. For uncertainty, we also have a
large outlier with a standard deviation of 1,641. Table 4.6 shows the correlations of our estimates
σ̂ f ullε and σ̂
a f e
ε for analyst disagreement and σ̂
f ull
ν and σ̂
a f e
ν for economy-wide uncertainty with
three other measures that have been used in the literature to measure uncertainty or analyst
disagreement. For each of the 917 firms in our sample, we calculate the other measures for
the last year of the estimation period and report correlations across these 917 firms in Table
4.6. The table shows Pearson correlations with p-values in parentheses above the diagonal and
Spearman rank correlations below the diagonal.
The first measure is the analyst forecast dispersion D j,t = 1N−1 ∑
N
i=1
(
Fi, j,t−F ., j,t
)2 which is
often used as proxy for analyst disagreement in the literature. However, it is widely acknowl-
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Table 4.6: Correlations of different measures of uncertainty and disagreement
This table displays correlations between several measures and estimates of uncertainty and disagreement across
firms. We consider the estimator σε of our full model and the APE model, the economy-wide uncertainty σν of
our full model and the APE model, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, Amihud’s (Amihud, 2002) measure
of illiquidity, and the bid-ask spread. The last three measures (Std.dev. AF, Amihud, and Bid-Ask) are estimated
from the last year of the sample that we used to estimate σε and σν . The table shows Pearson correlations above
the diagonal and Spearman rank correlations below the diagonal. P-values are shown in parentheses.
# Obs: 716 σ̂ f ullε σ̂
f ull
ν σ̂
a f e
ε σ̂
a f e
ν Std.dev. AF Amihud Bid-Ask
σ̂ f ullε
1.00 0.07 0.91 0.79 0.74 0.10 0.01
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.74)
σ̂ f ullν
0.73 1.00 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.26) (0.95) (0.87)
σ̂a f eε
0.97 0.76 1.00 0.81 0.82 0.14 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.78)
σ̂a f eν
0.80 0.94 0.80 1.00 0.48 0.14 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.88)
Std.dev. AF
0.69 0.59 0.70 0.63 1.00 0.05 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.78)
Amihud
0.09 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.09 1.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.52)
Bid-Ask
0.10 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.15 -0.46 1.00
(0.01) (0.17) (0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
edged that this measure also captures uncertainty that is not related to analyst disagreement (see
Barry and Jennings (1992) and Barron et al. (1998)). From Equation (4.3), the forecast Fi,t also
depends on uncertainty σν if the analyst’s target quantile Φ−1(qi) is nonzero. Therefore, we
expect that both of our estimates σ̂ε and σ̂ν are correlated with analyst forecast dispersion.
The second measure is Amihud’s (Amihud, 2002) measure of illiquidity. For each day, we
calculate the ratio of the absolute stock return of firm j and its dollar volume and then average
this ratio across all days of the year. Our final measure is the average bid-ask-spread that is an-
other measure of illiquidity. According to standard arguments from the market microstructure
literature, illiquidity is mostly caused by asymmetric information but not (or to a much lesser
extent) by economy wide uncertainty. We therefore expect that σ̂ε and σ̂ν are positively corre-
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lated with Amihud’s measure and with the bid-ask spread, but that the correlations are stronger
with σ̂ε than with σ̂ν .
When we consider Spearman correlations below the diagonal, we find that analyst disagree-
ment σ̂ε is positively correlated with Amihud’s illiquidity measure and with the bid-ask spread.
It is also highly positively correlated with analyst dispersion. The economy-wide uncertainty
σ̂ν is also positively correlated with these three measures, but the correlation with analyst dis-
persion is smaller than for σ̂ε . Pearson correlations above the diagonal in general corroborate
these findings, except for the bid-ask spread that is not significantly related to any other measure
according to the Pearson correlations. Also, for the estimator of the full model, σ̂ f ullν , Pearson
correlations are close to zero whereas Spearman correlations are positive and significant. Ex-
cept for the last effect, results are rather similar for the full model and the AFE model. Hence,
Table 4.6 also suggests that the simpler AFE model can be used without much loss of precision.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)
Deze dissertatie omvat drie onderzoeken die betrekking hebben op verschillende gebieden. Het
eerste onderzoek, opgenomen in hoofdstuk 2, benadert het probleem van het trekken van con-
clusies uit populaties van ondernemingen die in omvang verschillen. Dit zogenaamde schaal-
probleem leidt vaak tot onjuiste conclusies in onderzoek op het gebied van accounting en fi-
nance.
Het tweede onderzoek, opgenomen in hoofdstuk 3, bestudeert ondernemingen die hebben
gekozen voor de rechtsvorm “Societas Europaea” (Europese Vennootschap); dat is een nieuwe
rechtsvorm op basis van wetgeving in de Europese Unie. In dit onderzoek wordt in het bijzonder
ingegaan op de vraag waar en wanneer ondernemingen overgaan op de nieuwe rechtsvorm
en wat de invloed is van de doorgevoerde veranderingen op de aandeelhouderswaarde van de
ondernemingen.
Het laatste onderzoek, opgenomen in hoofdstuk 4, is gericht op de winstvoorspellingen van
financieel analisten; hierbij worden financieel analisten ingedeeld in twee categorieën: opti-
misten en pessimisten. Op basis van bepaalde kenmerken van financieel analisten worden zij
ingedeeld in de categorie optimist dan wel pessimist. Het onderzoek toont aan dat betere voor-
spellingen worden gegenereerd als er geen optimisten of pessimisten zouden zijn, en in plaats
daarvan alle financieel analisten zonder vooringenomenheid (vertekening) zouden voorspellen.
Op het gebied van finance en accounting willen onderzoekers vaak economische gevol-
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gen onderkennen die onafhankelijk zijn van de omvang van de ondernemingen in de onder-
zoekspopulatie.Veel economische verschijnselen zijn echter wel gerelateerd aan de omvang van
ondernemingen: grote ondernemingen genereren hogere resultaten en hebben daarom hogere
marktwaarden, grote ondernemingen genereren meer “accruals”. Omdat schaaleffecten zo vaak
voorkomen is het belangrijk om hiervoor te corrigeren.
In de gangbare benaderingen wordt verondersteld dat variabelen naar evenredigheid op om-
vang worden geschaald en dat daardoor alle variabelen die beïnvloed worden door omvang
worden gedeeld door een factor die geldt als “proxy” voor de omvang van de onderneming.
Naast de veronderstelling dat omvang evenredig is aan de andere variabelen, kan deze be-
nadering leiden tot extreme waarden als de noemer nadert tot nul. Hoofdstuk 2 stelt een een-
voudige transformatie voor die het schaalprobleem verandert in een probleem van niet opgenomen,
gecorreleerde variabelen. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat deze transformatie leidt tot resultaten die
vanuit economisch oogpunt intuïtief juist zijn, terwijl de traditionele benadering vaak leidt tot
resultaten die niet-intuïtief juist zijn.
De door mij voorgestelde transformatie leidt tot betere statistische resultaten dan de tra-
ditionele benadering van schatting van coëfficiënten in een regressieanalyse met behulp van
de methode van de kleinste kwadraten (“ordinary least squares”), hetgeen de meest gebruikte
schattingstechniek is in economische studies.
In een setting, waarin de marktkapitalisatie wordt voorspeld met twee cijfers uit de financiële
verslaggeving, namelijk winst en boekwaarde van het eigen vermogen, heeft de traditionele
benadering een “root mean squared error”, die ongeveer 2,5 keer groter is dan de “root mean
squared error” van de door mij voorgestelde transformatie.
Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeert ondernemingen die hebben gekozen voor de rechtsvorm Societas
Europaea (SE) (Europese Vennootschap). De SE is een nieuwe rechtsvorm, ontstaan in 2001,
die gedeeltelijk onder de wetgeving van de Europese Unie valt. De Europese Commissie
creëerde de SE om het voor de Europese ondernemingen gemakkelijker te maken om hun
vestigingsplaats in de EU te wijzigen,met andere ondernemingen in de EU te fuseren, en om
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meer flexibiliteit te bewerkstelligen in de regeling van medezeggenschap van werknemers en de
samenstelling van het bestuur.
Hoewel de SE enerzijds aandeelhouderswaarde zou kunnen creëren door fusies die minder
kosten met zich meebrengen, door een efficiëntere organisatie van bedrijfsonderdelen of door
een meer op de onderneming toegesneden regeling van de medezeggenschap van werknemers,
is het anderzijds ook mogelijk dat de SE aandeelhouderswaarde vernietigt als managers de SE
gebruiken om hun eigen belangen na te streven ten koste van de belangen van de aandeelhoud-
ers. Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeert hoe SEs waarde creëren en vernietigen.
Hoewel ik geen significante abnormale rendementen vind als gevolg van wijziging van de
medezeggenschapsverhoudingen door de keuze van de rechtsvorm van de SE, concludeer ik
wel dat ondernemingen in gereguleerde bedrijfstakken een hoger abnormaal rendement hebben
van 2,7 procentpunten dan ondernemingen in niet-gereguleerde bedrijfstakken.
Daartegenover staat dat ondernemingen die hun managementstructuur van twee lagen (man-
agementlaag en toezichtlaag) naar één laag (bestuurslaag) veranderen 3,7 procentpunten lagere
abnormale rendementen hebben dan ondernemingen die hun managementstructuur niet veran-
deren. De conclusies zijn in overeenstemming met de visie dat de SE waarde vernietigt als
managers de SE gebruiken om het toezicht op het bestuur af te zwakken door de toezichtlaag af
te schaffen.
Daar staat tegenover dat de flexibiliteit die de SE heeft om haar vestigingsplaats te wijzigen
waardevol is voor ondernemingen die in gereguleerde bedrijfstakken opereren, d.w.z. bedrijf-
stakken waarbij de winstgevendheid afhangt van vergunningen of subsidies van de overheid.
Hoofdstuk 3 concludeert ook dat ondernemingen die overgaan op de rechtsvorm SE al voordat
zij hun rechtsvorm wijzigden slechter presteerden dan hun tegenhangers in de bedrijfstak.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert het gedrag van financieel analisten. Ingolf Dittmann en ik schatten
een model waarin financieel analisten steeds verkeerde voorspellingen doen. Financieel analis-
ten die steeds te hoge winsten voorspellen zijn optimisten en financieel analisten die steeds te
lage opbrengsten voorspellen zijn pessimisten.
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Ons model levert empirisch bewijs dat 73 % van de financieel analisten optimisten zijn en
dat 27 % van de financieel analisten pessimisten zijn. We concluderen dat optimisten min-
der optimistisch zijn als ze voor grotere effectenmakelaars werken. We hebben geen bewijs
gevonden dat ervaring van financieel analisten een verklaring biedt voor hun optimisme of pes-
simisme. Als een praktisch gevolg van onze conclusie kunnen we een winstvoorspelling doen
waarin wordt gecorrigeerd voor optimisme en pessimisme in individuele voorspellingen.
Deze voorspelling is nauwkeuriger dan conventionele voorspellingen zoals de consensusvoor-
spelling (het gemiddelde van alle individuele voorspellingen). Onze voorspelling kan ook meer
variatie in de winst per aandeel verklaren dan conventionele voorspellingen.
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